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THE CLAIMS AND LIMITS OF JUSTICE SCALIA’S
TEXTUALISM: LESSONS FROM HIS STATUTORY
STANDING DECISIONS
Michael P. Healy †

Two decisions written by Justice Scalia near the end of his life, Lexmark
International Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 479 (2014), and
Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170 (2011), reshaped the law
of statutory standing and provide important insights into the claims and limits of
textualism. These decisions have reshaped the law of statutory standing in three
ways. They have changed the legal terminology; expanded the range of cases to which
the zone-of-interests test applies; and changed the application of the zone-of-interests
test when it applies to determine statutory standing. This Article discusses these
changes and addresses how they relate to the textualist method of statutory
interpretation. The current significance of textualism, which emerged after Justice
Scalia became an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, has led
Justice Kagan, the appointee of President Barak Obama, to state that “we’re all
textualists now.” 1
The first Part of the Article briefly describes the critical role that Justice Scalia
played in the emergence of textualism as a central method for the interpretation of
statutes. The Article then considers the rhetoric and legal craft employed by Justice
Scalia to accomplish important changes in the law of statutory standing. These
† Charles S. Cassis Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. J.D., 1984,
University of Pennsylvania; B.A., 1978, Williams College. The author thanks Professors Paul
Salamanca and Kent Barnett for reviewing an earlier draft of this Article. The author also
thanks the University of Kentucky College of Law for supporting the research and writing of
this article with a summer research grant. The author is responsible for any errors.
1 Justice Elena Kagan, The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Kagan on the Reading of
Statutes at 8:28 (Nov. 17, 2015), http://today.law.harvard.edu/in-scalia-lecture-kagan-discussesstatutory-interpretation [https://perma.cc/3U59-BKQZ].
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changes concern the respective roles that the legislature and the judiciary play in
determining who may bring claims in federal court pursuant to the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) and other federal statutes. The second Part of the Article
discusses how Justice Scalia quickly and decisively reshaped the nomenclature that
the Court applies to this area of the law. By changing the legal terminology from
prudential standing to statutory standing, Justice Scalia framed his claim that
Congress had sole authority to define the parties who had a right to bring a claim in
federal court when the party has Article III standing. Locating this authority in the
legislature, rather than in the judiciary’s exercise of its own prudential power,
reinforced Justice Scalia’s claim that his textualist method ensured legislative
supremacy and limited opportunities for judicial activism.
Despite this claim, Justice Scalia’s other two changes to the law of statutory
standing had the effect of constraining by judicial interpretation the scope of
statutory standing relative to statutory text and legislative intent. First, Justice Scalia
interpreted statutory text that was extremely broad in the legislative grant of
statutory standing and intended to allow an action by any party aggrieved by a
claimed government illegality to grant statutory standing only to a party who met the
zone-of-interests test. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court in Association of Data
Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), identified a
wholly new test for what he called “prudential standing,” a test that we know as the
zone-of-interests test. Justice Douglas defined this test in order to expand the scope of
statutory standing that Congress had provided when it enacted § 702 of the APA.
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court in two decisions more than forty years later,
pragmatically employed the ahistorical, court-contrived zone-of-interests test to limit
the scope of statutory standing defined by Congress in clear statutory text that
broadly provided for statutory standing. These decisions added to the legal error that
Justice Douglas committed in Data Processing, this time in the service of reducing
the scope of standing compared to what Congress had intended and provided in the
clear language of the statute. Justice Scalia’s decisions undermine the broader scope
of statutory standing defined by Congress in particular statutes.
The second change in statutory standing law was that Justice Scalia, having
determined for the Court that the zone-of-interests test would determine whether a
party had statutory standing, concluded that the zone-of-interests test, when applied
outside the APA context, necessitated a showing that the claimed illegality
proximately caused the injury to the person bringing the claim. This proximate cause
requirement is not found in statutory text or in legislative history. Rather, Justice
Scalia decided that Congress had to be understood to have imposed a proximate
cause limit when the zone-of-interests test applies and, at least for now, when the
claim is not brought under the APA.
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This interpretive result is claimed to follow from the prescription of the
legislature, rather than the prudent activism of the judiciary. Contrary to this claim
of textualism, the decisions in these cases show that Justice Scalia was willing and
able to be an activist judge when the text enacted by Congress did not align with his
own views of good policy. The decisions in these cases show the limits of textualism
and provide strong reason to doubt the claims that that the preeminent advocate of
textualism made about the virtues of that interpretive method.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article describes and assesses Justice Antonin Scalia’s
decisions in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components,
Inc., 2 and Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP. 3 These decisions
have reshaped the law of statutory standing in three ways. They have
changed the legal terminology; they have expanded the range of cases to
which the zone-of-interests test applies; and they have changed the
application of the zone-of-interests test when it applies to determine
statutory standing. This Article discusses these changes and addresses
how they relate to the textualist method of statutory interpretation. The
current significance of textualism, which emerged after Justice Scalia
became an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, has led
Justice Kagan, the appointee of President Barak Obama, to state that,
“we’re all textualists now.”4
The first Part of the Article briefly describes the critical role that
Justice Scalia played in the emergence of textualism as a central method
for the interpretation of statutes. 5 This Part describes the rule of law and
externality claims presented on behalf of textualism. 6 It also discusses
how textualism has cast doubt on some canons of construction 7 and has
rejected the other two conventional approaches to statutory
interpretation, intentionalism and purposivism. 8
The Article then considers the rhetoric and legal craft employed by
Justice Scalia to accomplish important changes in the law of statutory
standing. These changes concern the respective roles that the legislature
and the judiciary play in determining who may bring claims in federal
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

572 U.S. 118 (2014).
562 U.S. 170 (2011).
See Kagan, supra note 1.
See infra Part I.
See infra notes 20–28 and accompanying text.
See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 31–42 and accompanying text.
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court pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 9 and other
federal statutes. The second Part of the Article discusses how Justice
Scalia quickly and decisively reshaped the nomenclature that the Court
applies to this area of the law. Justice Scalia maintained that the new
terminology reflected a doctrinal focus on the legislature and the
legislature’s own determination of the parties authorized to bring an
action in federal court claiming a statutory violation. Although the
changed nomenclature appears to conform to the claims of textualism,
the change should, instead, be seen as a disingenuous effort to present,
as legislatively determined, standards for statutory standing that the
Court itself has defined, without attending to either the statutory text or
the intent of Congress. 10
The third Part of the Article discusses how Justice Scalia’s decisions
for the Court have significantly expanded the scope of application of the
zone-of-interests test. In order to provide context for understanding
Justice Scalia’s unlikely embrace of this modern test for APA standing,
the Article provides the historical background of statutory standing
before the APA and that statute’s codification of that body of law. The
Article then describes how Justice Douglas, writing for the Court in
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 11
identified a wholly new test for what he called “prudential standing,” a
test that we know as the zone-of-interests test. Justice Douglas defined
this test in order to expand the scope of statutory standing that Congress
had provided when it enacted § 702 of the APA. This Part then discusses
how Justice Scalia, writing for the Court in two decisions, pragmatically
employed the ahistorical, court-contrived zone-of-interests test to limit
the scope of statutory standing defined by Congress, by ignoring clear
statutory text that broadly provided for statutory standing. These
decisions added to the legal error that Justice Douglas committed in
Data Processing, this time in the service of reducing the scope of
standing compared to what Congress had intended and provided in the
clear language of the statute. Justice Scalia’s decisions undermine the
broader scope of statutory standing defined by Congress in particular
statutes. The broad application of the zone-of-interests test that Justice
9
10
11

Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. (2006)).
See infra notes 74–81 and accompanying text.
397 U.S. 150 (1970).
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Scalia has championed reflects neither the text of the relevant statutes
nor the intent of the enacting legislatures.
The fourth Part of the Article considers how Justice Scalia, having
defined the zone-of-interests test as the default test that determines
statutory standing for all federal statutes, regardless of date of
enactment, began the work of narrowing the scope of that test by
finding a new limit to the parties who are arguably within the zone of
interests. It begins by discussing how the Court’s zone-of-interests test
came to be applied as the Court moved to a textualist interpretive
approach. The test had emerged when the Court was comfortable
identifying interests arguably protected by a statute based on legislative
intent, discernable through text and legislative history, and on statutory
purpose. Indeed, the test appeared to limit standing only when
legislative intent indicated to the Court that Congress had not intended
to protect a particular interest. The textualist method, which rejects
legislative intent as a basis for interpretation, had to rely on only
inference and effect to determine arguably protected interests. The
method therefore had the effect of expanding statutory standing using
the zone-of-interests test. In this context, Justice Scalia determined that
a new limit, a proximate cause requirement, had been enacted by
Congress as part of an understanding of the background law. Justice
Scalia accordingly found a legal limit to narrow the statutory standing
defined by Congress, notwithstanding extremely broad statutory text
and the absence of an indication that Congress did not intend to protect
the interests presented by the plaintiffs.
This new proximate cause limit may allow the Court’s conservative
members to narrow the scope of statutory standing in cases when a
textualist applying the traditional zone-of-interests test would likely be
unable to limit statutory standing beyond the limits defined by Article
III. In short, Justice Scalia sought to narrow the scope of statutory
standing by defining new limits that he claimed Congress should be
understood to have enacted in the absence of having previously enacted
text sufficiently clear to overcome the Court’s new presumptive
meaning of text. This judicial activism contrasts starkly with the broad
claims of the objectivism of the textualist method and the claim of the
new nomenclature that the statutory standing doctrine does not include
a prudential component and merely follows Congress’s directions
regarding the parties who may bring a statutory claim. Finally, the
Court’s rationale supporting this proximate cause limit also appears to
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apply to the APA itself, so it may be only a matter of time before the
proximate cause limit on the zone-of-interests test also applies in the
APA context.
I. JUSTICE SCALIA AND THE CLAIMS OF TEXTUALISM
Beginning in the 1980s, 12 Justice Scalia emerged as the leading
advocate of the textualist approach 13 to the interpretation of statutes. 14
For Justice Scalia, “The text is the law, and it is the text that must be
observed.”15 This textualist interpretive approach has affected the
American legal system to such a great extent that Justice Elena Kagan,
appointed by Democratic President Barack Obama, has reportedly
stated that everyone now engaged in statutory interpretation is a
textualist. 16

12 See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U.
L.Q. 351, 363 (1994) (“The rapid spread of textualism among the Justices no doubt owes
something to Justice Scalia’s powers of persuasion. Since 1987, Justice Scalia has been
conducting what amounts to a continuous seminar on the virtues of textualism and evils of
legislative history.”).
13 See Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 347 (2005) (“One of the
leading approaches [to statutory interpretation], championed by Justices Scalia and Thomas on
the Supreme Court and by Judge Easterbrook on the Seventh Circuit, goes by the name of
‘textualism.’”).
14 See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118 (2016)
(reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)) (“By emphasizing the centrality
of the words of the statute, Justice Scalia brought about a massive and enduring change in
American law.”); JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 49 (1st ed. 2010) (“Near the close of the twentieth
century, a group of self-described ‘textualist’ judges—most prominently, Justice Antonin Scalia
and Judge Frank Easterbrook—challenged many of the key assumptions defining traditional
purposivism.”); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 4 n.5 (2001) (“The Court’s leading textualists are Justices Scalia and Thomas.”) (citations
omitted).
15 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 22 (1997)
16 See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Keynote Address: Two Challenges for the Judge as Umpire:
Statutory Ambiguity and Constitutional Exceptions, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1907, 1910 (2017)
(“Text matters. The text of a law is the law. As Justice Kagan recently stated, ‘we’re all
textualists now.’”).

Healy.40.6.5 (Do Not Delete)

2868

7/15/2019 4:47 PM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:2861

Justice Scalia is, of course, the legal figure who has been credited
with shaping this change in the practice of statutory interpretation. 17
Although disagreement continues about the degree to which courts
remain willing to ground the interpretation of a statute in interpretive
sources outside of the statute’s text, 18 modern American statutory
interpretation is now greatly concerned with the words of the statute. 19

17 See Abbe R. Gluck, Justice Scalia’s Unfinished Business in Statutory Interpretation: Where
Textualism’s Formalism Gave Up, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2053, 2054 (2017) (“No one had a
more important impact on the modern theory and practice of statutory interpretation than did
Justice Scalia.”); Kavanaugh, supra note 16, at 1910 (“Statutory interpretation has improved
dramatically over the last generation, thanks largely to Justice Scalia. Justice Scalia brought
about a massive and enduring change in statutory interpretation.”); Merrill, supra note 12 and
accompanying parenthetical; WILLIAM D. POPKIN, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: POLITICAL
LANGUAGE AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 337 (1993) (characterizing Justice Scalia as “the most
prominent textualist on the contemporary Supreme Court”).
18 See Gluck, supra note 17, at 2057–58 (“Thanks to the great intellectual efforts of
textualists, purposivists, and pragmatists over the past three decades, a basic equilibrium has
emerged. All sides have significantly moderated and largely have converged on a middleground, text-focused position that, for most practitioners and judges (even if not for Justice
Scalia himself), includes recourse to broader context, including, in disciplined fashion (again
largely thanks to Justice Scalia), legislative materials.”) (citations omitted). With specific regard
to the use of legislative history, all Members of the Court, except Justice Scalia, joined an
opinion in which Justice White, writing for the Court, stated:

As for the propriety of using legislative history at all, common sense suggests that
inquiry benefits from reviewing additional information rather than ignoring it. As
Chief Justice Marshall put it, “[w]here the mind labours to discover the design of the
legislature, it seizes every thing from which aid can be derived.” Legislative history
materials are not generally so misleading that jurists should never employ them in a
good-faith effort to discern legislative intent. Our precedents demonstrate that the
Court’s practice of utilizing legislative history reaches well into its past. We suspect
that the practice will likewise reach well into the future.
Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610 n.4 (1991) (citations omitted).
19 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY, ELIZABETH GARRETT, & JAMES J.
BRUDNEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 592 (5th ed. 2014) (“First, and foremost, the text is now, more
than it was 30 years ago, the central inquiry at the Supreme Court level . . . .”); Jonathan T.
Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 36 (2006) (“Textualism’s
adherents and nonadherents often opt to caricature and talk past one another, rather than to
acknowledge just how thoroughly modern textualism has succeeded in dominating
contemporary statutory interpretation. Although some scholars on both sides have noticed the
shift in judicial attitudes discussed above, neither side of the debate has been eager to
acknowledge just how much we have all become textualists.”) (citations omitted); see also
Merrill, supra note 12, at 355 (“By far the most important story from the Supreme Court on the
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Justice Scalia’s advocacy of textualism is grounded in several
claimed values that he and other commentators have associated with the
textualist approach. First, the claim is made that textualism is consistent
with judicial neutrality and restraint. 20 By employing textualism, a court
is simply finding the law that the legislature has defined in the text of the
statute. 21 The necessary limit on the use of legal sources outside of the
text constrains courts from imposing their own view of good law onto
the statutes enacted by Congress. 22 Notwithstanding this claim of
judicial neutrality and restraint, Justice Scalia had recognized that even a
restrained court would have to ignore clear text in some unusual
circumstances. 23
Related to the claim that textualism is neutral is the claim that the
content of law can and should be understood by a reading of the
statutory text with the words receiving their ordinary meaning. 24 This
statutory interpretation front these days is the emergence of the textualist method associated
with Justice Scalia.”).
20 See Scalia, supra note 15, at 23 (“A text should not be construed strictly, and it should not
be construed leniently; it should be construed reasonably to contain all that it fairly means.”);
Gluck, supra note 17, at 2071 (“Justice Scalia often insisted, as part of his formalist defense of
textualism, that textualism’s rules are value-neutral.”) (footnote omitted); Kavanaugh, supra
note 16, at 1909 (“What did Justice Scalia stand for as a judge? It’s not complicated, but it is
profound. The judge’s job is to interpret the law, not to make the law or make policy. So read
the words of the statute as written.”).
21 See MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 14, at 49 (“Modern textualists emphasize that
judges must respect the legislative compromise embedded in the statutory text.”).
22 See Molot, supra note 19, at 26 (“[T]extualists believed that by emphasizing statutory text
over statutory purposes, and by excluding legislative history in particular, they could narrow
[judicial] leeway.”) (citation omitted); id. at 27 (“a judge who favors statutory purposes over
statutory text risks not only confusing his own policy views with those of Congress, but also
violating the Constitution by making federal law outside of the constitutionally prescribed
lawmaking procedures.”) (citations omitted); id. at 26 (“Textualists were not content merely to
accept the leeway inherent in interpretation, but rather sought to cabin it.”).
23 See Kavanaugh, supra note 16, at 1910 (“When the text is clear, the Court says, follow the
text unless the text is absurd or unless the text is overridden by some clear statement canon of
interpretation. That is a neutral principle: It is not pro-business or pro-labor, pro-manufacturer
or pro-environment, pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant. And Justice Scalia is largely to thank for
that.”) (emphasis added). Justice Scalia’s view of the absurd result exception and clear
statement rules will be discussed later in this article. See infra notes 42, 182 and accompanying
text (absurd result rule); note 238 and accompanying text (clear statement rule).
24 See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 405 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Our job begins
with a text that Congress has passed and the President has signed. We are to read the words of
that text as any ordinary Member of Congress would have read them, and apply the meaning so
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formalist approach 25 to the content of statutory law has roots in the
understanding of the United States as a nation of laws, 26 as well as in the
legal realism of Oliver Wendell Holmes. 27 Textualists claim the
interpretive approach ensures that statutory law is objective and
external, 28 depriving a court of the opportunity to impose its own
subjective understanding of the law by the subterfuge of
interpretation. 29 For this reason, Justice Scalia expressed concerns about
judges employing substantive canons to determine the interpretive
result, notwithstanding the apparent meaning of the statute’s text. 30
In addition to advocating the textualist approach to interpreting
statutes, Justice Scalia rejected intentionalism and purposivism, the
determined.”) (citation omitted)); SCALIA, supra note 15, at 22 (“The text is the law, and it is
the text that must be observed.”).
25 See Gluck, supra note 17, at 2056 (“And yet the core of Justice Scalia’s textualism, as he
himself presented it, was supposed to be formalism.”).
26 See SCALIA, supra note 15, at 17 (“It is the law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver.
That seems to me the essence of the famous American ideal set forth in the Massachusetts
constitution: A government of laws, not of men. Men may intend what they will; but it is only
the laws that they enact which bind us.”).
27 See Oliver W. Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 419
(1899) (“We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means.”).
28 Id. at 418–19 (“[W]e ask[] not what this man meant, but what those words would mean
in the mouth of a normal speaker of English, using them in the circumstances in which they
were used . . . . But the normal speaker of English is merely a special variety, a literary form, so
to speak, of our old friend the prudent man. He is external to the particular writer, and a
reference to him as the criterion is simply another instance of the externality of the law.”).
29 See Gluck, supra note 17, at 2064 (“[T]extualists, including Justice Scalia, lean heavily on
textualism’s purported formalism to argue textualism’s normative superiority . . . . They also
cling to formalism as the justification for why it is acceptable to forgo an interpretive approach
that is more tethered to the way Congress actually operates and drafts; the idea being that
congressional reality is impossible to decipher and so we trade off the value of that democratic
connection to Congress in exchange for the ‘rule of law’ values and the benefits that a formalist
regime brings.”).
30 See SCALIA, supra note 15, at 27–28 (“[P]resumptions and rules of construction that load
the dice for or against a particular result . . . . increase the unpredictability, if not the
arbitrariness of judicial decisions.”); Gluck, supra note 17, at 2071 (“Justice Scalia’s most
important writing on statutory interpretation, his 1989 Tanner Lecture, expressed discomfort
with the policy canons. He called them ‘thumb on the scales’ and ‘dice-loading’ rules. He was
willing to use them nonetheless—likely because he had to, because text cannot answer every
question.”); ESKRIDGE ET. AL., supra note 19, at 746 (“[O]f the 27 majority opinions Justice
Scalia authored construing federal workplace law statutes between 1986 and 2002, he invoked
textual canons one-third of the time as part of his reasoning but never invoked substantive
canons.”).
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other two conventional approaches to statutory interpretation. Chief
Justice Rehnquist, the conservative jurist who served as Chief Justice for
much of Justice Scalia’s term on the Court, 31 believed that a court’s
interpretation of a statute is determined by “the intent of Congress.”32
Justice Stevens, a jurist generally viewed as a liberal, agreed with this
intentionalist methodology. 33
Despite the appeal of intentionalism across the range of political
ideology, Justice Scalia rejected the approach. 34 He believed that the
intentionalist approach, which accepts that legislative history may
properly inform the interpretation of statutes because that history
provides evidence of congressional intent, violates rule of law
principles 35 by authorizing courts to interpret statutes subjectively and
determine the content of law based on their own policy preferences.36
31 See Michael P. Healy, Legislative Intent and Statutory Interpretation in England and the
United States: An Assessment of the Impact of Pepper v. Hart, 35 STAN. J. INT’L L. 231, 232–35
(1999).
32 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 253–54 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (“Our task in this case, like any other case involving the construction of a statute, is
to give effect to the intent of Congress. To divine that intent, we traditionally look first to the
words of the statute and, if they are unclear, then to the statute’s legislative history.”); Griffin v.
Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570 (1982) (“Our task is to give effect to the will of
Congress.”).
33 Griffin, 458 U.S. at 578 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In final analysis, any question of
statutory construction requires the judge to decide how the legislature intended its enactment
to apply to the case at hand.”). Justice Brennan, another liberal Justice also supported an
intentionalist approach to interpreting a statute. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440
U.S. 490, 511 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he judiciary[’s] . . . proper role in construing
statutes . . . is to interpret them so as to give effect to congressional intention.”).
34 See SCALIA, supra note 30 and accompanying parenthetical; Michael P. Healy, Means and
Ends in City of Arlington v. FCC: Ignoring the Lawyer’s Craft to Reshape the Scope of Chevron
Deference, 76 U. PITT. L. REV. 391, 414 (2015) (discussing Justice Scalia’s rejection of legislative
intent as a basis for interpretation).
35 Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 122 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“The only sure indication of what Congress intended is what Congress enacted;
and even if there is a difference between the two, the rule of law demands that the latter prevail.
This case will live with Church of the Holy Trinity as an exemplar of judicial disregard of
crystal-clear text. We must interpret the law as Congress has written it, not as we would wish it
to be.”).
36 See SCALIA, supra note 15, at 18 (“[Y]our best shot at figuring out what the legislature
meant is to ask yourself what a wise and intelligent person should have meant; and that will
surely bring you to the conclusion that the law means what you think it ought to mean—which
is precisely how judges decide things under the common law.”) (emphases in original); id. at 36
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Justice Scalia also rejected intentionalism because he believed that the
approach subverted the Constitution’s bicameralism and presentment
requirements. 37 Another of his critiques of intentionalism is that it gave
an advantage to litigants who had the means to study and present
legislative history to controvert the easier to determine, apparent
meaning of the statute’s text. 38
(“In any major piece of legislation, the legislative history is extensive, and there is something for
everybody.”); see also Zuni, 550 U.S. at 118 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Why should we suppose
that in matters more likely to arouse the judicial libido—voting rights, antidiscrimination laws,
or environmental protection, to name only a few—a judge in the School of Textual Subversion
would not find it convenient (yea, righteous!) to assume that Congress must have meant, not
what it said, but what he knows to be best?”); Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 518 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“Judge Harold Leventhal used to describe the use of legislative history
as the equivalent of entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests
for one’s friends. If I may pursue that metaphor: The legislative history of § 205 of the Soldiers’
and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act contains a variety of diverse personages, a selected few of whom—
its ‘friends’—the Court has introduced to us in support of its result. But there are many other
faces in the crowd, most of which, I think, are set against today’s result.”); Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
The Supreme Court’s New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the
Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 777 (1995) (Justices Scalia and Thomas are
among those who “are so hostile [to legislative history] that any reference to legislative history
in a majority opinion is virtually certain to draw a rebuke in a concurring or dissenting
opinion”).
37 Zuni, 550 U.S. at 117 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Legislative history can never
produce a ‘pellucidly clear’ picture of what a law was ‘intended’ to mean, for the simple reason
that it is never voted upon—or ordinarily even seen or heard—by the ‘intending’ lawgiving
entity, which consists of both Houses of Congress and the President (if he did not veto the
bill). . . . [T]he system of judicial amendatory veto over texts duly adopted by Congress bears no
resemblance to the system of lawmaking set forth in our Constitution.”) (internal citations
omitted).
38 Aniskoff, 507 U.S. at 518–19 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court feels compelled to
demonstrate that its holding is consonant with legislative history, including some dating back
to 1917—a full quarter century before the provision at issue was enacted. That is not merely a
waste of research time and ink; it is a false and disruptive lesson in the law. It says to the bar
that even an ‘unambiguous [and] unequivocal’ statute can never be dispositive; that,
presumably under penalty of malpractice liability, the oracles of legislative history, far into the
dimmy past, must always be consulted. This undermines the clarity of law, and condemns
litigants (who, unlike us, must pay for it out of their own pockets) to subsidizing historical
research by lawyers.”); Zuni, 550 U.S. at 119 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I do not believe that what
we are sure the Legislature meant to say can trump what it did say. Citizens arrange their affairs
not on the basis of their legislators’ unexpressed intent, but on the basis of the law as it is
written and promulgated. I think it terribly unfair to expect that the two rural school districts
that are petitioners here should have pored over some 30 years of regulatory history to divine
Congress’s ‘real’ objective (and with it the ‘real’ intent that a majority of Justices would find
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Justice Scalia also rejected the purposivist approach to interpreting
statutes. Warren Burger, who was serving as Chief Justice of the United
States when Justice Scalia joined the Court, had written for the Court
not long before Justice Scalia became a Justice that “[i]t is a wellestablished canon of statutory construction that a court should go
beyond the literal language of a statute if reliance on that language
would defeat the plain purpose of the statute.” 39 Consistent with the
textualist approach, 40 Justice Scalia rejected the idea that the purpose of
a statute could trump the meaning of its text. 41
In addition to rejecting two accepted methods for interpreting
statutes, textualists have challenged other traditional interpretive devices
that had the effect of limiting the effect of statutory text. Textualists, for
example, have expressed reservations about applying the absurd results
rule, because it allows an activist court to ignore the plain meaning of
the text when a judge decides that the meaning is an absurd result that
Congress could not have intended. 42 For similar reasons, Justice Scalia
honest and true). To be governed by legislated text rather than legislators’ intentions is what it
means to be ‘a Government of laws, not of men.’”).
39 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983).
40 See MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 14, at 49 (“textualists build on the premise of
legislative supremacy to argue that judges must hew closely to the meaning of a clear statutory
text even when the result contradicts the statute’s apparent purpose, however, derived.”).
41 See W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98–99 (1991) (Scalia, J.) (“As we have
observed before, however, the purpose of a statute includes not only what it sets out to change,
but also what it resolves to leave alone. The best evidence of that purpose is the statutory text
adopted by both Houses of Congress and submitted to the President. Where that contains a
phrase that is unambiguous—that has a clearly accepted meaning in both legislative and
judicial practice—we do not permit it to be expanded or contracted by the statements of
individual legislators or committees during the course of the enactment process.”) (citation
omitted).
42 See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 19, at 585 (textualists believe that “the normative rule of
law advantages of textualism would be compromised by a subjective, absurd-results exception:
because ‘absurdity’ is in the mind of the beholder, the law would lose some degree of
predictability and objectivity”). See generally John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116
HARV. L. REV. 2387 (2003). Judge Frank Easterbrook, a prominent textualist, has written that
“[t]he dearth of modern ‘substantive absurdity’ decisions is readily understandable. Scholars as
well as judges have recognized that a power to fix statutes substantively would give the Judicial
Branch too much leeway to prefer its views about what makes for ‘good’ laws over those of the
Legislative Branch.” Jaskolski v. Daniels, 427 F.3d 456, 462 (7th Cir. 2005) (Easterbrook, J.)
(citations omitted).
Justice Scalia, however, did recognize the absurd result exception to the rule that the
court define the law based on the meaning of the text. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co.,
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was concerned about the use of substantive canons that would yield
interpretive results that were inconsistent with the meaning of the
statute’s text. 43
Despite Justice Scalia’s claims about the values of the textualist
method, there is reason to have serious doubts that the approach, at
least as applied by Justice Scalia, actually conforms to the formalist
values of objectivity, externality, and rule of law. 44 In considering how
Justice Scalia applied his interpretive approach to the law of statutory
standing, important limits on his interpretive approach become evident.
II. SETTING THE TABLE WITH NEW NOMENCLATURE: FROM JUDICIAL
PRUDENCE TO LEGISLATIVE DIRECTIVE
The modern era of statutory standing traces back to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations,
Inc. v. Camp. 45 There, companies providing data processing services
claimed that the Comptroller of the Currency acted unlawfully when he
permitted banks to provide data processing services to their customers.
The Court considered the scope of standing available to claimants
seeking review under the APA. 46 Justice Douglas, writing for a majority
of the Court, believed that a party seeking to bring an action in federal
court had to demonstrate standing beyond the requirements imposed by
Article III. In Justice Douglas’s view, non-Article III standing
490 U.S. 504, 527–30 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 19, at
584–85 (noting that Justice Scalia accepted the absurd result exception to textualism).
43 See SCALIA, supra note 15, at 28 (“To the honest textualist, all of these preferential rules
and presumptions are a lot of trouble.”).
44 See Gluck, supra note 17, at 2076 (“Justice Scalia created the field of modern statutory
interpretation, but he, like the textualism he entrenched across the U.S. courts, was never really
formalist. There are too many rules; the rules lack predictable means of application; they lack a
clear legal status or even a defined source; and they are as activist as pragmatism and
purposivism, albeit in a different way.”); see also id. at 2061 (“[S]tatutory interpretation, as
Scalia himself developed it, now more closely resembles a multifactor test than a formalist
regime. A field with more than one hundred potentially applicable doctrines, with no order
ranking those doctrines, and no clear rule about when individual doctrines are triggered and in
what order they are triggered, effectuates an intense methodological pluralism.”) (citation
omitted).
45 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
46 The Court’s decision on the merits of this question is discussed infra Section III.A.
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requirements were defined by a combination of limits determined by
the judiciary and the legislature. The former were defined narrowly to
reflect judicial restraint and the latter were defined generously by
contemporary statutes:
Apart from Article III jurisdictional questions, problems of standing,
as resolved by this Court for its own governance, have involved a
“rule of self-restraint.” Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255.
Congress can, of course, resolve the question one way or another,
save as the requirements of Article III dictate otherwise. Muskrat v.
United States, 219 U.S. 346.
Where statutes are concerned, the trend is toward enlargement of the
class of people who may protest administrative action. The whole
drive for enlarging the category of aggrieved “persons” is
symptomatic of that trend. 47

Justice Brennan dissented from this view that the standing doctrine
extended beyond the minimum requirements of Article III. 48 His
position was that a plaintiff has standing once the party has met the
requirements of Article III, 49 and that the only remaining question was
whether Congress had provided for reviewability of the matter, 50 a
question that necessitated a statutory determination whether Congress
had authorized the claimant to bring the action. 51
The Supreme Court returned to this question of non-Article III
standing in an action brought under the APA in Air Courier Conference
of America v. American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO. 52 The Court
Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 154.
See id. at 167 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He was joined by Justice White in his dissent.
49 See id. at 168.
50 See id. at 169 (“Before the plaintiff is allowed to argue the merits, it is true that a canvass
of relevant statutory materials must be made in cases challenging agency action. But the canvass
is made, not to determine standing, but to determine an aspect of reviewability, that is, whether
Congress meant to deny or to allow judicial review of the agency action at the instance of the
plaintiff.”).
51 See id. at 169 n.2 (“Reviewability has often been treated as if it involved a single issue:
whether agency action is conclusive and beyond judicial challenge by anyone. In reality,
however, reviewability is equally concerned with a second issue: whether the particular plaintiff
then requesting review may have it. Both questions directly concern the extent to which
persons harmed by agency action may challenge its legality.”) (citation omitted).
52 498 U.S. 517 (1991).
47
48
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adhered to the approach it had taken to standing in Data Processing: a
claimant must demonstrate that it meets both the Article III test for
injury in fact and the APA’s zone-of-interests test. 53 When he explained
the function of the zone-of-interests test in Bennett v. Spear, 54 Justice
Scalia focused on the prudential limit explanation and the role of the
judiciary in defining the limit:
In addition to the immutable requirements of Article III, the federal
judiciary has also adhered to a set of prudential principles that bear
on the question of standing. Like their constitutional counterparts,
these judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal
jurisdiction, are founded in concern about the proper—and properly
limited—role of the courts in a democratic society; but unlike their
constitutional counterparts, they can be modified or abrogated by
Congress. Numbered among these prudential requirements is the
doctrine of particular concern in this case: that a plaintiff’s grievance
must arguably fall within the zone of interests protected or regulated
by the statutory provision or constitutional guarantee invoked in the
suit. 55

Justice Scalia specifically referred to the requirement of “prudential
standing” in his analysis. 56
When the Court later decided a prominent case addressing a
plaintiff’s standing to bring an action under the APA, the Court
reiterated the use of the term “prudential standing” to describe the
doctrinal question:
We have interpreted § 10(a) of the APA to impose a prudential
standing requirement in addition to the requirement, imposed by
Article III of the Constitution, that a plaintiff have suffered a
sufficient injury in fact. For a plaintiff to have prudential standing
under the APA, “the interest sought to be protected by the

53
54
55
56

Id. at 523.
520 U.S. 154 (1997).
Id. at 162 (quotations and citations omitted).
Id. at 161, 163.
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complainant [must be] arguably within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated by the statute . . . in question.” 57

The Court used this terminology of prudential standing throughout the
opinion. 58 Justice O’Connor, writing for the four dissenters in the case,
also used the prudential standing terminology in her opinion,
emphasizing that the doctrine is grounded in a need for judicial
restraint even when construing the scope of standing defined by
Congress:
Prudential standing principles “are ‘founded in concern about the
proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic
society.’” The zone-of-interests test is an integral part of the
prudential standing inquiry, and we ought to apply the test in a way
that gives it content. The analysis the Court undertakes today, in my
view, leaves the zone-of-interests requirement a hollow one. 59

In the Roberts Court’s decision in Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish
Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 60 Justice Kagan, writing for an
eight-Justice majority, again employed the prudential standing
terminology in deciding whether the plaintiff met the APA’s zone-ofinterests test. 61
Justice Scalia, however, brought this long- and well-accepted 62 use
of the prudential standing nomenclature to an end with his 2014
decision, Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components,
Inc. 63 Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, specifically opined
about the proper terminology to be used when considering whether a
party meeting the irreducible minimum requirements of Article III

57 Nat’l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 488 (1998)
(citations omitted).
58 See, e.g., id. at 485, 486, 490.
59 Id. at 518 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
60 567 U.S. 209 (2012).
61 See id. at 224–26.
62 The use of the “prudential standing” nomenclature was not limited to Supreme Court
decisions. Legal scholarship also followed the Court’s terminology. See, e.g., Eugene
Kontorovich, What Standing is Good For, 93 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1670 (2007) (“Beyond this
constitutional ‘core’ of standing are ‘prudential’ standing rules invented by the courts
themselves. Congress can presumably override these ‘self-imposed limits.’”) (citation omitted).
63 572 U.S. 118 (2014).
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standing 64 may bring a statutory claim in federal court. Justice Scalia
began the Court’s analysis of this issue “by clarifying the nature of the
question at issue in this case,” 65 which “[t]he parties’ briefs
treat[ed] . . . as one of ‘prudential standing.’” 66 The Court,
notwithstanding its own continued use of the terminology, found “that
label misleading.”67
Justice Scalia acknowledged that the parties had good reason to
claim that the Court’s cases had delineated a “‘prudential’ branch of
standing,” 68 that incorporated “the zone of interests” limit on parties
that were able to assert a claim in court. 69 He also acknowledged that
limiting a party’s ability to bring a claim for “prudential” reasons “is in
some tension with” the Court’s view that a federal court is obligated to
adjudicate “cases within its jurisdiction.” 70
Justice Scalia opined that, even though the Court had used the term
“prudential standing” to describe the test for a plaintiff’s ability to assert
a statutory claim, 71 the issue must properly be viewed as determined by
statute, rather than a court’s exercise of prudent restraint: “Whether a
plaintiff comes within ‘the “zone of interests”’ is an issue that requires us
to determine, using traditional tools of statutory interpretation, whether
a legislatively conferred cause of action encompasses a particular
plaintiff’s claim.” 72
The Court then held that the proper inquiry in determining
whether a claimant who has Article III standing may bring a claim in
federal court is entirely a question of (textualist) statutory construction:

64 See id. at 125–26 (“Lexmark does not deny that Static Control’s allegations of lost sales
and damage to its business reputation give it standing under Article III to press its falseadvertising claim, and we are satisfied that they do.”).
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 See id. at 125–29.
70 Id. at 125–26.
71 See id. at 127.
72 Id. (citations omitted); see id. (“As Judge Silberman of the D.C. Circuit recently observed,
‘“prudential standing” is a misnomer’ as applied to the zone-of-interests analysis, which asks
whether ‘this particular class of persons ha[s] a right to sue under this substantive statute.’”)
(citation omitted).
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[W]e ask whether [the claimant] has a cause of action under the
statute. That question requires us to determine the meaning of the
congressionally enacted provision creating a cause of action. In doing
so, we apply traditional principles of statutory interpretation. We do
not ask whether in our judgment Congress should have authorized
Static Control’s suit, but whether Congress in fact did so. Just as a
court cannot apply its independent policy judgment to recognize a
cause of action that Congress has denied, it cannot limit a cause of
action that Congress has created merely because “prudence”
dictates. 73

To reiterate, the question of statutory standing is resolved by
“determin[ing] the meaning of the congressionally enacted provision
creating a cause of action.” 74 Justice Scalia accordingly concluded that
labeling this issue as one of “statutory standing” “is an improvement
over the language of ‘prudential standing,’ since it correctly places the
focus on the statute.” 75 He also opined, however, that the statutory
standing label “is misleading, since ‘the absence of a valid (as opposed to
arguable) cause of action does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction,
i.e., the court’s statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the
case.’” 76
In short, Justice Scalia used his majority opinion in Lexmark
International as the occasion for rejecting a doctrine that had allowed
courts to define limits on a potential plaintiff’s ability to bring a
statutory claim in federal court. Rather than permit the judiciary to
define prudential limits on the right to sue, the Court’s reshaped
doctrine purports to focus the question of the right to sue on the limits,
if any, defined by the legislature once the minimum requirements of
Article III are met. 77 The Court maintained that the judiciary must
73 Id. at 127–29 (citations omitted). See also id. at 128 (“[T]his case presents a
straightforward question of statutory interpretation: Does the cause of action in § 1125(a)
extend to plaintiffs like Static Control?”).
74 Id.
75 Id. at 128 n.4. The statutory standing label is one that Justice Scalia had applied
previously. See Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 286 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“The ultimate question here is statutory standing . . . .”).
76 Lexmark Int’l, 572 U.S. at 128 n.4 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
77 See James E. Pfander, Scalia’s Legacy: Originalism and Change in the Law of Standing, 6
BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 85, 87 (2017) (“Justice Scalia worked to eliminate prudential
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neither expand nor contract the cause of action that Congress has
defined in “the congressionally enacted provision creating a cause of
action.”78 The change made by Justice Scalia is sensible in the light of his
commitment to textualism. 79 His claim was that the judiciary is bound
to accept and apply the scope of the cause of action defined by the
statute, as long as the plaintiff has Article III standing. 80 As a textualist,
his claim was that the judiciary may not subjectively (or prudentially)
constrain the scope of standing defined by the legislature. 81
As we will see in the rest of this Article, Justice Scalia’s new
nomenclature set the table for important changes in the substantive law
of statutory standing. The new nomenclature permitted Justice Scalia to
explain these changes to be not the result of the activism of a prudently
restrained judiciary, but rather the result of the legislature providing
plain textual directives to the judiciary, which would simply implement
those directives. 82 As will be discussed, there is great irony in Justice
Scalia’s claim that a party’s ability to sue will be determined objectively
by Congress’s grant of the right to bring a claim, rather than by a court’s
subjective judgment about the parties that may properly bring an action
in federal court.
III. ESTABLISHING THE NEW STATUS QUO: THE EXPANDED AND
ANACHRONISTIC SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THE FLAWED AND
CONSTRAINED APA ZONE-OF-INTERESTS TEST
Having described how Justice Scalia changed the terminology
applicable to the question of the parties that may properly bring a
statutory action in federal court once the minimum requirements of
Article III standing are met, we turn to a consideration of how Justice
Scalia reshaped the scope of application of the zone-of-interests test and
doctrines, preferring in the absence of perceived constitutional limits to define the right of
individuals to sue by reference to the text of applicable legislation.”) (citation omitted).
78 Lexmark Int’l, 572 U.S. at 128.
79 See supra Part I.
80 See Lexmark Int’l, 572 U.S. at 128–29.
81 See supra notes 63–76 and accompanying text.
82 See Pfander, supra note 77, at 99 (“Lexmark ends the doctrine of sub-constitutional
prudential standing, transforming the inquiry into a merits-based assessment of the right to
sue.”).
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wrote the decision in which the Court held that the zone-of-interests
test presumptively defines the scope of statutory standing under all
federal statutes. This Part begins with a summary of the improbable
source of the zone-of-interests test and how Justice Douglas created that
test to expand the scope of statutory standing. The Article then discusses
two decisions written by Justice Scalia in which the Court has defined
the broad presumptive scope of application of the zone-of-interests test.
In these decisions, Justice Scalia interpreted the statutes as providing
statutory standing for parties that met the zone-of-interests test,
notwithstanding statutory text that included an extremely broad grant
of statutory standing and was enacted prior to the Court’s initial
definition of the zone-of-interests test.
A.

The Roots of Statutory Standing and the Improbable Source of the
Zone-of-Interests Test

The sources of the law of statutory standing extend back into the
nineteenth century and involve common law, rather than statutory,
controversies. In Mayor of Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., the
Court held that several private party plaintiffs did not have a right to
pursue a common law public nuisance claim because the plaintiffs did
not allege a special injury. 83 The common law public nuisance claim, in
the Court’s view, could be asserted by a private party only when the
private party is able to allege and then prove that the party suffered a
special injury. 84
The Court opined that a plaintiff must demonstrate a legally
protected right in order to bring a court action against a defendant. A
defendant is not subject to a plaintiff’s claim in court when the
defendant has caused injury to the plaintiff but has not acted unlawfully,
as well as when the defendant’s unlawful conduct has injured the
plaintiff but the plaintiff has no legal right that has been harmed. 85 Even
assuming that the defendant’s conduct was a public nuisance, a private
party has a common law right to a judicial remedy only when the

83
84
85

Georgetown v. Alexander Canal Co., 37 U.S. 91 (1838).
See id. at 99.
See id. at 97.
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private party suffered a special injury, that is, an injury different from
the injury suffered by the public. 86 Even though Alexandria Canal is a
common law case, the case is an early example of the principle that a
party may bring a judicial action only when the law, in this case the
common law, has recognized that the plaintiff has a legal interest that
may be protected by a court. Although determining whether a party had
a legal interest did not involve deciding whether the defendant had
engaged in a public nuisance, the legal interest determination did
necessitate a substantive decision whether the private plaintiff’s injury
was special under common law standards.
More than forty years after Alexandria Canal, the Court returned
to the issue of a plaintiff’s ability to bring a court action claiming
common law liability in New Orleans, Mobile & Texas Railway Co. v.
Ellerman. 87 Ellerman, the plaintiff in the action, held a contract with the
City of New Orleans to operate a wharf. 88 Ellerman brought the action
against the defendant railroad claiming the railroad was unlawfully
permitting a wharf to be operated on land leased from New Orleans,
and that this competing wharf was injuring Ellerman’s business. 89 The
claimed unlawfulness was the railroad’s breach of contractual
conditions on the use of the land that the railroad had leased. 90 The
claim was therefore based on the common law, rather than a statute. 91
The Court concluded that the plaintiff had no legal right to assert a
common law claim:
The only injury of which [plaintiff] can be heard in a judicial tribunal
to complain is the invasion of some legal or equitable right. If he
asserts that the competition of the railroad company damages him,
the answer is, that it does not abridge or impair any such right. If he
alleges that the railroad company is acting beyond the warrant of the
law, the answer is, that a violation of its charter does not of itself

86
87
88
89
90
91

See id. at 100.
105 U.S. 166 (1881).
See id. at 168–69.
See id. at 169–70.
See id.
See id. at 173–74.
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injuriously affect any of his rights. The company is not shown to owe
him any duty which it has not performed. 92

The only American decision that the Court cited in support of this
principle was Alexandria Canal. 93 The Court accordingly held that the
plaintiff’s action had to be dismissed. 94
Just over forty years after Ellerman, the Court began deciding the
series of cases that defined the modern understanding of statutory
standing in administrative law, the understanding that Congress
codified when it enacted the APA. In Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees
v. United States, 95 Justice Brandeis authored a brief opinion for a
unanimous Court. Edward Hines brought an action claiming that the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) had acted illegally when it
issued an order that cancelled penalty charges that had been imposed to
prevent undue detention of railroad equipment during the emergency
conditions resulting from World War I. 96 Edward Hines was a large
manufacturer and claimed that the cancellation of penalty charges was
causing competitive injury because those charges had the effect of
“severe[ly] handicap[ping]” the plaintiff’s “rivals in business.”97
Justice Brandeis concluded that the plaintiff could not maintain the
action because the ICC order had not caused any legal injury to the
plaintiff and the plaintiff failed to pursue an action to redress the only
legal injury it might have claimed:
[P]laintiffs could not maintain this suit merely by showing (if true)
that the Commission was without power to order the penalty charges
canceled. They must show also that the order alleged to be void
subjects them to legal injury, actual or threatened. This they have
wholly failed to do. It is not alleged that the carriers wish to impose
such charges and, but for the prohibition contained in the order,
would do so. For aught that appears carriers are well satisfied with
the order entered. Cancellation of a charge by which plaintiffs’ rivals

92
93
94
95
96
97

Id. at 174
Id.
Id.
263 U.S. 143 (1923).
See id. at 144–46.
Id. at 146–48.
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in business have been relieved of the handicap theretofore imposed
may conceivably have subjected plaintiffs to such losses as are
incident to more effective competition. But plaintiffs have no
absolute right to require carriers to impose penalty charges.
Plaintiffs’ right is limited to protection against unjust discrimination.
For discrimination redress must be sought by proceedings before the
Commission. Its findings already made, and the order entered,
negative such claim in this connection. The correctness of those
findings cannot be assailed here; among other reasons, because the
evidence on which they were made is not before the Court. 98

By focusing on whether the plaintiff had suffered injury to a
legally-defined right, the Court’s reasoning in this statutory case was the
same as its reasoning in the common law cases. The Court did not
present the analytic basis for its holding that the statute did not provide
the plaintiff with a legal right. The Court merely stated its conclusion
that plaintiff lacked a legal right and therefore the ability to “maintain
this suit.” 99
One year later, in the Chicago Junction Case, 100 Justice Brandeis
again wrote the opinion for the Court and decided whether the plaintiff
had a right to bring an action claiming a statutory violation by the ICC.
The ICC had issued an order authorizing the New York Central
Railroad to purchase the stock of the Chicago River & Indiana Railroad
and to lease the Chicago Junction Railway. 101 Plaintiffs opposed the
issuance of this order before the ICC and then brought the action in
court. 102 The plaintiff railroads claimed that the ICC order injured them
because the New York Central, as owner of the rail lines around
Chicago, would treat the New York Central favorably and would allow
unequal, reduced access to them as competitors of the New York
Central. 103 The statute permitted the transfer of control of the railways

Id. at 148 (citations omitted).
Id.
100 264 U.S. 258 (1924).
101 See id. at 318.
102 See id.
103 See id. at 320 (“The plaintiffs are no longer permitted to compete with the New York
Central on equal terms. A large volume of traffic has been diverted from their lines to those of
the New York Central.”).
98
99
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only if the ICC approved the transfer agreement based on the ICC’s
determination “that the acquisition ‘will be in the public interest.’” 104
The Court distinguished Edward Hines as involving an injury that
was simply “the incident of more effective competition.” 105 The Court
found that the plaintiffs’ injury in Chicago Junction was, rather, “injury
inflicted by denying to the plaintiffs equality of treatment. To such
treatment, carriers are, under the Interstate Commerce Act, as fully
entitled as any shipper.”106 The Court concluded that the Transportation
Act of 1920 granted to the plaintiffs “a special [legal] interest in the
proposal to transfer the control to [the New York Central].” 107
Justice Sutherland, joined by Justices McReynolds and Sanford,
dissented on the grounds that the plaintiffs had suffered only
irremediable competitive injury as a result of the ICC order. The
plaintiffs lacked a legal interest in the order:

Id. at 263.
Id. at 267. Justice Brandeis had written the opinion for the unanimous Court in Edward
Hines. See supra note 93.
106 Chi. Junction, 264 U.S. at 267 (citation omitted).
107 Id. The Court’s brief analysis of the source of the plaintiffs’ legal interest was the
following:
104
105

It is true that, before Transportation Act 1920, the Interstate Commerce Act would
not have prohibited the owners of the terminal railroads from selling them to the
New York Central. Nor would it have prohibited the latter company from making
the purchase. And by reason of a provision then contained in section 3 of the
Interstate Commerce Act the purchase might have enabled the New York Central to
exclude all other carriers from use of the terminals. But Transportation Act 1920
repealed that provision in section 3, it made provision for securing joint use of
terminals, and it prohibited any acquisition of a railroad by a carrier, unless
authorized by the Commission. By reason of this legislation, the plaintiffs, being
competitors of the New York Central and users of the terminal railroads theretofore
neutral, have a special interest in the proposal to transfer the control to that
company.
Id. (citations omitted). The Court also concluded that the plaintiffs could proceed with their
court action because they had participated as parties before the agency. See id. at 268 (“No case
has been found in which either this court, or any lower court, has denied to one who was a
party to the proceedings before the Commission the right to challenge the order entered
therein.”). This rationale does not address the fact that a party may have the right to participate
as a party in an agency proceeding, but may lack Article III standing to bring a claim in court.
See Envirocare of Utah, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 194 F.3d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

Healy.40.6.5 (Do Not Delete)

2886

7/15/2019 4:47 PM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:2861

A private injury, for which the law affords no remedy, cannot be
converted into a remediable injury, merely because it results from an
act of which the public might complain. In other words, the law will
afford redress to a litigant only for injuries which invade his own
legal rights; and since the injuries here complained of are not of that
character, and do not result from the violation of any obligation
owing to the complainants, it follows that they are without legal
standing to sue. 108

Justice Sutherland concluded that the 1920 Railway Act required
the ICC to consider only the public interest, rather than the private
interests of competing railroads, when deciding whether to approve a
railway purchase. 109 Only a public party could bring a judicial action to
protect the public interest. 110 He also decided that the statute required
equality of treatment only in the distribution of access to railway lines
operated by entities other than by the owner itself. The use of additional
lines by the owner company would mean that fewer lines would be
available to lines operated by companies other than the owner. The
statutory requirement of equal treatment applied only to the use of lines
by non-owner operated companies. 111
Justice Sutherland’s dissent illustrates how the Court’s analysis of
whether a statute has created a legal interest in a party implicates the
merits of the underlying dispute. The legality of the order at issue in the
Chicago Junction Case would likely turn on a court’s view of the nature
of the equality requirement defined by the statute. As we will see, Justice
Douglas wished to separate the merits question from the statutory
standing question when he defined the zone-of-interests test under the
APA. 112

Chi. Junction, 264 U.S. at 272–73 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
See id. at 271.
110 Id. at 271–72 (“The complainants have no standing to vindicate the rights of the public,
but only to protect and enforce their own rights. Redress for public grievances must be sought
by public agents, not by private intervention.” (citations omitted)). In this regard, the dissent
echoed the reasoning of the Alexandria Canal Court in the common law context. See supra
notes 83–86 and accompanying text.
111 Chi. Junction, 264 U.S. at 273–74.
112 See infra notes 147–49 and accompanying text.
108
109
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In 1933, the Court decided ICC v. Oregon-Washington Railroad
and Navigation, Co. 113 and began a second line of statutory standing
decisions. This decision marked a turn by the Court away from the legal
injury requirement and toward a determination of statutory standing
based on Congress’s express grant of a right of action. The Court held
that a private party could continue to litigate its legal defense of an order
issued by the ICC, after the ICC itself declined to appeal an adverse
court decision, because Congress had enacted a provision that allowed
legal action “by an aggrieved party.” 114 The Court decided that this
provision had to be construed to allow pursuit of the action by a private
party or the statutory provision would have no legal effect:
The statute clearly provides that, in the trial of the case, the
intervening parties shall not be foreclosed by the action or nonaction
of the Attorney General. Even though he concludes not to defend,
they are permitted to do so. If, notwithstanding their defense, a
decree goes against them and the United States, can it have been the
purpose of Congress that the failure of the Attorney General to
prosecute an appeal concludes such interveners? We think not. So to
hold would render meaningless and superfluous section 2 of the act,
which permits a review of the action of the court below ‘if appeal to
the Supreme Court be taken by an aggrieved party. . . .’ The section
can be given effect only by holding that an aggrieved party may
challenge the decree not only to vindicate his own rights, but those of
the United States as well. Congress evidently intended the Attorney
General should represent and protect the interests of the United
States as such, but should not at any stage control the litigation
against the objection of the other parties and to their disadvantage,
and that any aggrieved party might obtain a decree which the United
States could have secured had it defended the action or prosecuted an
appeal. 115

113 Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Oregon-Washington R.R. & Navigation Co., 288 U.S.
14 (1933).
114 Id. at 26.
115 Id. at 25–26. The fact that a private party suffered actual aggrievement would have to be
demonstrated in order to prove the required Article III standing.
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Two aspects of the Court’s decision are notable. First, the Court’s
interpretation is grounded fully on the statute’s text. The Court employs
the superfluity canon, which directs that a court should interpret a
statute so that all of its provisions have legal effect. 116 We will see that
this canon has been notably employed 117 and ignored 118 in the Court’s
statutory standing jurisprudence.
Second, by focusing on the congressional grant of statutory
standing to any “aggrieved party,” the Court was able to focus on the
consequences of the action being challenged (and whether the party was
thereby aggrieved), rather than the legal rights protected by the statute, a
determination that, as we have seen, may implicate the merits of the
litigation. 119
Five years later, the Court returned to the question of statutory
standing in Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes. 120 There, Justice Sutherland, a
dissenter in Chicago Junction, 121 wrote the Court’s opinion holding that
the plaintiff could not bring a court action claiming that a federal agency
had acted unlawfully when it issued loans to a competitor of the
plaintiff. Justice Sutherland concluded that the injury suffered by the
plaintiff, economic damage caused by a competitor who was able to
supply energy because of the federal loans it had received, was a
consequence of lawful competition 122 and did not result from the
“invasion of some legal or equitable right.” 123 He distinguished Chicago
Junction on the ground that the claimants in that case had “a special
interest recognized by certain provisions contained in [the 1920
Transportation Act], and under section 212 of the Judicial Code, which
gave any party to a proceeding before the commission the right to
Id. at 14.
In addition to the application of the canon here, see infra notes 132–34 and
accompanying text.
118 See infra notes 140–42 and accompanying text.
119 See infra notes 148–49 and accompanying text. The decision is reminiscent of the
National Credit Union case, discussed infra note 282. In each case, the conservative majority
views statutory standing broadly and is thereby able to decide that the agency sought to exercise
excessive regulatory power.
120 302 U.S. 464 (1938).
121 Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258 (1924).
122 See Alabama Power, 302 U.S. at 479–80.
123 Id. at 483. This language is very similar to the Court’s language in Ellerman. See supra
note 87.
116
117
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become a party to any suit wherein the validity of an order made in the
proceeding is involved.”124 Justice Sutherland accordingly decided that
statutory standing for the plaintiff was not available under either of the
two possible bases for statutory standing: the claimant could show
neither a legal interest nor an express grant of statutory standing by
Congress. Justice Sutherland believed that Alabama Power’s lack of
statutory standing was controlled by the Court’s decision in Ellerman,
which had held that mere competitive injury does not give rise to a right
to bring a court action. 125 Ellerman was, as we have seen, a case
involving a common law action. 126
Two years after Alabama Power, the line of the Court’s pre-APA
statutory standing decisions ended with FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio
Station. 127 The case allowed the Court to elaborate on the two alternate
rationales it had developed for determining whether a claimant had
statutory standing. The claimant had claimed that the FCC’s issuance of
a license had injured it because the agency had allowed a competitor to
operate a radio station in an area where the claimant offered radio
services. The FCC was authorized to issue licenses when the issuance of
the license was in the public interest. 128 The FCC, relying on the line of
cases requiring a claimant to demonstrate a legal injury in order to have
statutory standing, argued that Sanders Bros. suffered no legal injury
because the FCC may not refuse issuance of a license on the ground that
granting a license would cause economic injury to a competitor. 129
The Court agreed with the FCC that the statute did not require the
agency to consider competitive effects when deciding whether to grant a

Alabama Power, 302 U.S. at 479–80.
See id. at 483–84 (“A reading of the [Chicago Junction] case in connection with the
dissenting opinion shows very clearly that, but for express statutory provision creating a
different rule, the decision in the Ellerman Case would have been controlling.”).
126 See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text. The Court employed the same reasoning
to reach the same conclusion in Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 306 U.S.
118 (1939). There, the Court concluded that power companies lacked standing, because they
could not demonstrate that “the right invaded is a legal right,—one of property, one arising out
of contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers
a privilege.” Id. at 137–38.
127 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
128 See id. at 471–72.
129 See id. at 472–73.
124
125
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license. 130 The FCC argued further that, because the statute did not
protect the company’s right to broadcast without competition, the
competitive injury it was claiming was not a legal interest that gave the
company statutory standing to sue. 131 The FCC argument against
statutory standing was that “absence of right implies absence of
remedy.” 132
The Court rejected this argument by focusing on the text of the
statute, which granted a right of appeal to a court “‘by any other person
aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected by any decision of
the Commission granting or refusing any such application.’” 133
Employing reasoning similar to Oregon-Washington R.R., 134 the Court
decided that it had to give legal effect to this statutory provision:
Congress had some purpose in enacting section 402(b)(2). It may
have been of opinion that one likely to be financially injured by the
issue of a license would be the only person having a sufficient interest
to bring to the attention of the appellate court errors of law in the
action of the Commission in granting the license. It is within the
power of Congress to confer such standing to prosecute an appeal. 135

Sanders Bros. thus confirms that a party has statutory standing to
bring a claim in two circumstances: (1) the statute provides a legal right
to the claimant that the claimant believes has been violated; and (2)
Congress has expressly granted a right of review to a party aggrieved by
the claimed statutory violation. 136 The first circumstance will often
involve inferential reasoning about the interests protected by a statute,
while the second circumstance will involve an express provision of the
statute.
130 See id. at 476 (“We conclude that economic injury to an existing station is not a separate
and independent element to be taken into consideration by the Commission in determining
whether it shall grant or withhold a license.”).
131 See id. at 476–77.
132 Id. at 477.
133 Id. at 476–77 (quoting section 402(b)(2) of the Communications Act).
134 See supra notes 113–15 and accompanying text. See also Sanders Bros., 309 U.S. at 477 n.9
(citing Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Oregon-Washington R.R. & Navigation Co., 288 U.S.
14, 23–25 (1933)).
135 Id. at 477.
136 In either circumstance, the claimant would also have to demonstrate Article III standing.
See supra Part II.
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The next critical step in the development of the modern law of
statutory standing was the enactment in 1946 of the APA. 137 In that
statute, Congress addressed the issue of a person’s statutory standing by
including the following language: “A person suffering legal wrong
because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial
review thereof . . . .” 138 Although the language of the text is hardly
perfect, it does make it clear by the use of the disjunctive, “or,” that the
“entitle[ment] to judicial review” may be grounded in either “suffering
legal wrong” or being “adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action
within the meaning of a relevant statute.” The last phrase is
unfortunately obscure, and would have been far clearer if, for example,
it had read, “adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action if a
relevant statute grants review to a party in such a case.”
The text of section 702 accordingly recognized statutory standing
to challenge an agency’s action for either of the two reasons that had
been recognized by the Supreme Court for such standing: a party
suffering legal injury or a party “aggrieved” by an agency action and
granted statutory standing by Congress to sue by another statute. The
legislative history of the APA confirms this understanding of the intent
of those who developed the statute:
The Attorney General advised the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
of his understanding that [the first sentence of APA § 702] was a
restatement of existing law. More specifically he indicated his
understanding that [the first sentence of APA § 702] preserved the
rules developed by the courts in such cases as Alabama
Power . . . Chicago
Junction . . . and
Sanders
Bros. . . . . This
construction of [the first sentence of APA § 702] was not questioned
or contradicted in the legislative history. 139

In sum, if one considers statutory standing under the text and
intent of the APA, the statute simply codified the understanding of

137 See Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. (2006)).
138 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2018).
139 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT 96 (1947).
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statutory standing that had emerged through the nineteenth and the
first half of the twentieth century. That understanding was that a party
had statutory standing to sue when a statute gave the party a legal
interest that the government had injured or when a statute gave any
aggrieved party the right to sue. Therefore, section 702 had not granted
statutory standing itself, but looked to statutory standing being
determined by a statute either creating a legal interest or granting
standing expressly to any aggrieved party. 140
In Data Processing, 141 the Supreme Court decided the question of
statutory standing under the APA. A group of companies providing
data processing services brought a court action against the Comptroller
of the Currency, claiming that the Comptroller had acted unlawfully
when he permitted banks to provide data processing services to their
customers. 142
The court of appeals had affirmed the district court decision that
the plaintiff lacked statutory standing. The Supreme Court quoted the
reasoning of the court of appeals, which was the following:
“(A) plaintiff may challenge alleged illegal competition when as
complainant it pursues (1) a legal interest by reason of public charter
or contract, . . . (2) a legal interest by reason of statutory
protection, . . . or (3) a “public interest” in which Congress has
140 Justice Scalia had strongly suggested in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation this view
that the APA, properly understood, had simply restated the law of statutory standing that had
been accepted at the time of its enactment:

[T]he party seeking review under § 702 must show that he has “suffer[ed] legal
wrong” because of the challenged agency action, or is “adversely affected or
aggrieved” by that action “within the meaning of a relevant statute.” Respondent
does not assert that it has suffered “legal wrong,” so we need only discuss the
meaning of “adversely affected or aggrieved . . . within the meaning of a relevant
statute.” As an original matter, it might be thought that one cannot be “adversely
affected or aggrieved within the meaning” of a statute unless the statute in question
uses those terms (or terms like them)—as some pre-APA statutes in fact did when
conferring rights of judicial review. See, e.g., Federal Communications Act of 1934,
§ 402(b)(2), 48 Stat. 1093, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(6) (1982 ed.). We have
long since rejected that interpretation, however, which would have made the judicial
review provision of the APA no more than a restatement of pre-existing law.
Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990) (emphasis omitted).
141
142

397 U.S. 150 (1970).
See id. at 151.
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recognized the need for review of administrative action and plaintiff
is significantly involved to have standing to represent the
public . . . .”143

Before considering Justice Douglas’s reaction to each of these three
bases for statutory standing, it may be helpful to relate them to the law
that the Court had developed up until the time of the APA. The first
court of appeals rationale did not relate to statutory standing, but
instead reflected the rationale of the Court’s earliest common law cases,
in which the Court held that a party had standing only when the
common law gave the person the right to assert a claim by recognizing
the party’s legal interest. 144 Its second rationale resulted from the
application of that common law rule to statutory cases and held that a
plaintiff had standing to sue under a statute only when the statute gave
the party a legal interest. 145 The third rationale of the court of appeals
was based on Congress allowing broad review by granting any aggrieved
party the right to bring an action. 146
Despite the well- and long-established bases for the court of
appeals analysis, Justice Douglas quickly rejected that court’s view of the
statutory standing requirement. Regarding the legal interest or legal
injury basis for statutory standing, Justice Douglas stated twice that this
inquiry into the existence of a legal interest is not a proper basis for
recognizing a party’s statutory standing to sue. 147 As we have seen,
Justice Douglas’s position is inconsistent with a long line of Supreme
Court decisions. Justice Douglas also concluded that the third test,
“which rests on an explicit provision in a regulatory statute conferring
standing and is commonly referred to in terms of allowing suits by
‘private attorneys general,’ is inapplicable to the present case.”148 Justice
Douglas is stating here his conclusion that the statute that the plaintiff
143 Id. at 152–53 (quoting Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 406 F.2d 837,
842–43 (8th Cir. 1969)).
144 See supra text accompanying notes 83–94.
145 See supra text accompanying notes 100–07, 120–25.
146 See supra text accompanying notes 113–19, 127–39.
147 See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 n.1 (1970)
(“[T]he existence or non-existence of a ‘legal interest’ is a matter quite distinct from the
problem of standing.”) (citation omitted), 153 (“The ‘legal interest’ test goes to the merits. The
question of standing is different.”).
148 Id. at 153 n.1.
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claimed had been violated did not grant Sanders Bros. statutory standing
to any person aggrieved by the claimed violation of law. He provided no
explanation for this inapplicability. Presumably, the explanation was
that the statute governing the activities of the Comptroller did not
include a provision granting a right to judicial review for “any aggrieved
party.” The fact that Justice Douglas stated a conclusion about the
inapplicability of Sanders Bros. standing indicates that such a provision
would have provided statutory standing for the plaintiff, if the statute at
issue had included such a provision. Justice Douglas therefore did not
decide in Data Processing that the APA had affected the ability of a party
to assert Sanders Bros. standing when a statute provided such standing
for the plaintiff.
Having rejected the conventional tests for statutory standing
employed by the court of appeals, Justice Douglas fashioned his own
new test out of whole cloth and defined the law of statutory standing
post-APA: “The question of standing is different. It concerns, apart
from the ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ test, the question whether the interest
sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional
guarantee in question. Thus the Administrative Procedure Act grants
standing to a person ‘aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of
a relevant statute.’” 149 This reading of § 702 of the APA conflicts with
the understanding of the Attorney General’s Manual, which had
understood the provision to be looking to another statutory provision
for the grant of statutory standing, rather than to § 702 itself. 150
Moreover, as an interpretation of the text of § 702, the interpretation
conflicts directly with the superfluity canon employed by the Court in
149 Id. at 153 (citation omitted). In addition to its impact on a plaintiff’s standing to bring a
statutory claim, Justice Douglas’s decision in Data Processing regarding the application of the
zone-of-interests test had important consequences for prudential standing in constitutional
cases. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474–75 (1982) (“Beyond the constitutional requirements, the federal
judiciary has also adhered to a set of prudential principles that bear on the question of
standing. . . . [T]he Court has required that the plaintiff’s complaint fall within ‘the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.’”).
This effect emerged despite the fact that Data Processing did not involve a question of standing
to bring a constitutional claim and Justice Douglas’s statement about constitutional claims was
dictum.
150 See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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Oregon-Washington R.R. 151 Justice Douglas’s reading renders
superfluous the first part of the first sentence of the provision. The first
sentence of § 702 is the following: “A person suffering legal wrong
because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial
review thereof. . . .” 152 To hold that the second part of the section itself
grants standing to any person “arguably within the zone of interests to
be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in
question” 153 means that the first part, which grants standing to “[a]
person suffering legal wrong because of agency action,”154 is legally
superfluous and without effect. A person who suffers legal wrong by an
agency action would always be “arguably within the zone of interests to
be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in
question.”
Justice Douglas presented his view that Congress was extending the
scope of statutory standing to challenge agency action: “Where statutes
are concerned, the trend is toward enlargement of the class of people
who may protest administrative action. The whole drive for enlarging
the category of aggrieved ‘persons’ is symptomatic of that trend.” 155
Justice Douglas’s opinion is, however, a consequence of the Court’s own
interest in expanding the scope of statutory standing, rather than
congressional action in the APA. His conclusion is a simple ipse dixit
and accounts for neither the statute’s text nor the legislative history. His
interpretive approach foreshadows Justice Scalia’s decisions to apply the
zone-of-interests test in non-APA cases many years later. 156

288 U.S. 14, 25–26 (1933) (quoted supra note 115).
5 U.S.C. § 702 (2018).
153 Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153.
154 5 U.S.C. § 702.
155 Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 154. Justice Douglas gave two examples of cases allowing
parties standing to challenge government action. See id. at 154–55 (discussing Chicago v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 357 U.S. 77 (1958); Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 390
U.S. 1 (1968)). In each of those two cases, however, the competitor seeking to challenge
government action would traditionally have been understood to have a legal interest protected
by a statute. The cases are unexpected examples of the “trend” described by Justice Douglas.
Better examples would have involved the congressional grant of statutory standing to any
person aggrieved by agency action.
156 See infra notes 167–69 and accompanying text.
151
152
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The Data Processing Court completed its analysis by concluding
without additional reasoning that § 4 of the Bank Service Corporation
Act of 1962 157 “arguably brings a competitor within the zone of interests
protected by it.” 158 The tone of the Court’s analysis reflected a desire to
ensure that statutory standing would be widely available, allowing
interested, aggrieved parties to secure judicial review of agency
actions. 159 Justice Douglas’s decision, however, does not necessarily
ensure the broadest possible scope of statutory standing. To be sure, the
group of claimants that the Court concluded had been granted statutory
standing by the APA was broader than the group that would have been
able to demonstrate a legal injury under the reasoning of Alabama
Power. 160 In that respect, the decision expanded standing. However, the
grant of standing by the APA, as construed by Justice Douglas, was
narrower than Congress’s grant of statutory standing to “any aggrieved
party,” as the Court construed that exceptionally broad grant of
standing in Sanders Bros. Such a party would have had statutory
standing as long as the party met the minimum standing requirements
of Article III. 161 To be sure, Justice Douglas stated that this “private
attorneys general standing,” to use his term, was not applicable to the
plaintiff in Data Processing. 162 Therefore, he did not claim to be
changing the scope of standing granted by a statutory provision like the
157 Pub. L. No. 87-856, 76 Stat. 1132 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1864) (“No bank service
corporation may engage in any activity other than the performance of bank services for
banks.”). This provision was replaced in 1982. See Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469, Tit. VII,
§ 709.
158 Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 156.
159 Justice Brennan’s dissent, joined by Justice White, argued that the Court should
determine standing by considering only the constitutional requirement of injury in fact and by
rejecting analysis of statutory standing. See id. at 167–68 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan opined that, “[b]y requiring a second, nonconstitutional step, the Court comes very
close to perpetuating the discredited requirement that conditioned standing on a showing by
the plaintiff that the challenged governmental action invaded one of his legally protected
interests.” Id. at 168 (citation omitted). Justice Brennan’s characterization of the legal interest
requirement as “discredited” simply ignores the fact that the provision at issue, § 702,
specifically established legal injury as one of the two alternative bases for statutory standing.
The enacting Congress, which had the authority to define the scope of statutory standing,
apparently did not share Justice Brennan’s view that the doctrine was “discredited.” Id.
160 See Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 483 (1938).
161 See FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477 (1940).
162 Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153 n.1.
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one in Sanders Bros. Nevertheless, Justice Douglas never explained how
language that yielded the broadest possible statutory standing in Sanders
Bros. provided, in the context of the APA’s § 702, statutory standing
only for the smaller class of those arguably within the zone of
interests. 163 He provided the conclusion, but none of the reasoning.
In sum, after Data Processing, statutory standing to bring an action
under the APA required the plaintiff to demonstrate that the party was
arguably within the zone-of-interests protected by the provision that the
claimant contended had been violated by the agency.
B.

Justice Scalia and the Increased Scope of Application of the Zone-ofInterests Test

Given that the zone-of-interests test was established by an activist
Court reaching its interpretive conclusion without consideration of the
text and the legislative history of § 702, it is unsurprising that Justice
Scalia expressed skepticism about the test. 164 Moreover, Justice Scalia
had been the leading jurist who supported a narrow view of the scope of

163 Judge Fletcher has commented that the Data Processing decision also originated the
injury in fact requirement for constitutional standing, a requirement that Justice Douglas would
have been dismayed to fix limits on Article III standing. See William A. Fletcher, Standing: Who
Can Sue to Enforce a Legal Duty?, 65 ALA. L. REV. 277, 279 (2013) (“[T]he Court tells us that a
plaintiff must have suffered ‘injury in fact’ in order to have Article III standing. This
requirement originated in Justice Douglas’s 1970 opinion in Association of Data Processing
Service Organizations v. Camp. Prior to 1970, the Court had never insisted that a plaintiff have
‘injury in fact.’ I am fairly confident that Justice Douglas was not trying to make standing more
difficult for plaintiffs. But ever since Justice Douglas articulated the injury-in-fact requirement,
the Court has used it as a way of denying, rather than granting, standing to plaintiffs.”) (citation
omitted).
164 See Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153.
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constitutional standing. 165 He believed that broad standing undermines
the unitary executive and gives courts too much power. 166
Because the zone-of-interests test had been defined by the Court in
construing § 702, the test applied to actions brought under the APA to
challenge the actions of federal agencies. The zone-of-interests test had
not been applicable to claims brought under other federal statutes,
usually because there was no agency action at issue. 167 In this non-APA
context, Justice Scalia unexpectedly became a champion of the zone-ofinterests test and in two decisions he established the test as the
presumptive test for statutory standing to bring an action under any
federal statute. In both of these cases, the scope of statutory standing
actually enacted by Congress in the statutory text was, as will be seen,
the broad aggrieved party standing that the Court had construed in
Oregon-Washington R.R. and Sanders Bros. 168
165 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (Scalia, J.); Pfander, supra note 77,
at 105 (“One can hardly overstate either the degree to which Justice Scalia remade the law of
Article III standing or the degree to which he did so in the absence of support in the original
meaning of the document he set about to apply.”); Tara Leigh Grove, Justice Scalia’s Other
Standing Legacy, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 2243, 2243 (2017) (“[F]ew decisions in Article III standing
jurisprudence are as noteworthy (or as notorious) as Justice Antonin Scalia’s opinion for the
Court in Lujan, which restricted Congress’s power to confer standing on private individuals.”)
(citation omitted).
166 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577 (“To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public
interest in executive officers’ compliance with the law into an individual right vindicable in the
courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Executive’s
most important constitutional duty, to take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, Art. II,
§ 3. It would enable the courts, with the permission of Congress, to assume a position of
authority over the governmental acts of another and co-equal department, and to become
virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action.”) (internal
quotations and citations omitted); Pfander, supra note 77, at 99 (“Lujan achieved at least three
of Justice Scalia’s stated goals: it cut back on environmental standing; it established Article III as
a constraint on the extent to which Congress could involve the federal courts in the oversight of
the exercise of government enforcement discretion in the public law context; and it firmed up
the ban on the exercise of jurisdiction over generalized grievances by framing them as a
violation of the separation of powers.”); Grove, supra note 165, at 2251 (“To Scalia, standing
was a way to constrain the federal courts and prevent them from usurping the authority of the
political branches.”).
167 Depending on the particular agency action and the content of the applicable federal
statute, an agency action may be reviewed under a federal statute other than the APA. See, e.g.,
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 175 (1997). Such a case would not have involved the zone-ofinterests test as understood in Data Processing. See id.
168 See supra notes 113–16, 127–33 and accompanying text.
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In the first of these decisions authored by Justice Scalia, Thompson
v. North American Stainless, LP, the Court considered whether an
employee who had been fired could bring a Title VII action against his
employer. 169 The employee claimant alleged that he had been fired in
retaliation for a gender discrimination claim that his fiancé had filed
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against
the employer of both the claimant and the fiancé. The Court first had to
decide whether Title VII prohibited the firing of the claimant in
retaliation for his fiancé’s filing of a gender discrimination claim. The
Court held, “Title VII’s antiretaliation provision is worded broadly. We
think there is no textual basis for making an exception to it for thirdparty reprisals, and a preference for clear rules cannot justify departing
from statutory text.” 170
The Court therefore had to address “[t]he more difficult question”
of whether Title VII granted the claimant the right to assert a cause of
action for the alleged retaliation. Just as the anti-retaliation provision of
Title VII is “worded broadly,” 171 so, too, is the provision of Title VII that
defines the scope of statutory standing under the statue. That provision,
enacted by Congress in 1964, six years before Justice Douglas’s
unexpected decision for the Court in Data Processing, states that “a civil
action may be brought . . . by the person claiming to be aggrieved.”172
This language, by permitting a party “claiming to be aggrieved” to bring
an action, is arguably even broader than the broadly-worded grants of
statutory standing that the Court had construed in Oregon-Washington
R.R. and Sanders Bros., which allowed any aggrieved party to bring an
action. 173 The Sanders Bros. Court concluded that, by enacting that text,
Congress intended to provide to any person who suffered a cognizable
Article III injury a right to bring a claim. 174 Perhaps for this reason,
“[t]he Sixth Circuit concluded that this provision was merely a

See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 175 (2011).
Id. at 175.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 173 (citing Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(e), 78 Stat. 241, 260 (1964)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(b), (f)(1))).
173 See supra note 113 and accompanying text (Oregon Washington R.R.); supra note 127 and
accompanying text (Sanders Bros.).
174 See FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 476–77 (1940).
169
170
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reiteration of the requirement that the plaintiff have Article III
standing.” 175
In writing the decision for the Court in Thompson, Justice Scalia
initially conceded, without reference to Sanders Bros., that “[i]t is
arguable that the aggrievement referred to is nothing more than the
minimal Article III standing, which consists of injury in fact caused by
the defendant and remediable by the court.”176 The Court then
acknowledged that in an earlier decision, the Court, in dictum, had
accepted exactly this conclusion:
We have suggested in dictum that the Title VII aggrievement
requirement conferred a right to sue on all who satisfied Article III
standing. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205
(1972), involved the “person aggrieved” provision of Title VIII (the
Fair Housing Act) rather than Title VII. In deciding the case,
however, we relied upon, and cited with approval, a Third Circuit
opinion involving Title VII, which, we said, “concluded that the
words used showed ‘a congressional intention to define standing as
broadly as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution.’” Id., at 209
(quoting Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442, 446 (1971)).
We think that dictum regarding Title VII was too expansive. Indeed,
the Trafficante opinion did not adhere to it in expressing its Title
VIII holding that residents of an apartment complex could sue the
owner for his racial discrimination against prospective tenants. The
opinion said that the “person aggrieved” of Title VIII was coextensive
with Article III “insofar as tenants of the same housing unit that is
charged with discrimination are concerned.” 409 U.S., at 209
(emphasis added). Later opinions, we must acknowledge, reiterate
that the term “aggrieved” in Title VIII reaches as far as Article III
permits, see Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 165–166 (1997);
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109 (1979),
though the holdings of those cases are compatible with the “zone of
interests” limitation that we discuss below. In any event, it is Title VII

175
176

Thompson, 562 U.S. at 175–76 (citation omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).
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rather than Title VIII that is before us here, and as to that we are
surely not bound by the Trafficante dictum. 177

Given this opportunity to reconsider the Trafficante dictum and
the dictum in subsequent cases, Justice Scalia viewed the earlier position
as “ill-considered.”178 He claimed that “[i]f any person injured in the
Article III sense by a Title VII violation could sue, absurd consequences
would follow.” 179 He “therefore conclude[d] that the term ‘aggrieved’
must be construed more narrowly than the outer boundaries of Article
III.” 180 Justice Scalia did not describe any of the potential absurdities in
any detail. A reason to wonder whether there is any absurdity is that a
party claiming statutory standing based on aggrievement must, of
course, be able to demonstrate Article III standing by showing an actual
injury caused by the claimed illegality and which is redressable by a
court’s judgment. 181 Justice Scalia also did not consult legislative history,
as he had done in Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., to determine
whether Congress intended the consequence that is claimed to be
absurd. 182
Finally, Justice Scalia failed to address the fact that the Court had
previously interpreted very similar language in Oregon-Washington R.R.
and Sanders Bros. to reach the interpretive result that he now viewed as
“absurd.” Congress, of course, would have been aware of these decisions
when it drafted and enacted in 1964 the terms of Title VII, as part of the
landmark Civil Rights Act of that year. The usual interpretive rule is that
Congress understands how the Supreme Court has interpreted statutory

Id.
Id.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
182 In Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment,
concluded that the text of Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, “if interpreted literally,
produces an absurd, and perhaps unconstitutional, result.” In this circumstance, he wrote that
“I think it entirely appropriate to consult all public materials, including the background of Rule
609(a)(1) and the legislative history of its adoption, to verify that what seems to us an
unthinkable disposition (civil defendants but not civil plaintiffs receive the benefit of weighing
prejudice) was indeed unthought of, and thus to justify a departure from the ordinary meaning
of the word ‘defendant’ in the Rule.” 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989).
177
178
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text and that Congress’s use of such text indicates that Congress expects
the language to have the same legal effect. 183
As he proceeded to determine the narrower scope of statutory
standing defined by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Justice
Scalia rejected the interpretation “[a]t the other extreme” advocated by
the employer. 184 The Court concluded that the grant of statutory
standing was not limited only to “the employee who engaged in the
protected activity.”185 In his view, Congress would have used different
language in the text if it had intended to limit the availability of the
cause of action in this way. 186
Having rejected what he regarded as the two “extreme”
interpretations of the statute, 187 Justice Scalia settled on what he believed
was the proper construction of the statutory standing provision:
The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq., authorizes
suit to challenge a federal agency by any “person . . . adversely
affected or aggrieved . . . within the meaning of a relevant statute.”
§ 702. We have held that this language establishes a regime under
which a plaintiff may not sue unless he “falls within the ‘zone of
interests’ sought to be protected by the statutory provision whose
violation forms the legal basis for his complaint.” Lujan v. National
Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990). We have described the
“zone of interests” test as denying a right of review “if the plaintiff’s
interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the
purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed
that Congress intended to permit the suit.” Clarke v. Securities
Industry Assn., 479 U.S. 388, 399–400 (1987). We hold that the term
“aggrieved” in Title VII incorporates this test, enabling suit by any
plaintiff with an interest “arguably [sought] to be protected by the
statute,” National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat. Bank & Trust
Co., 522 U.S. 479, 495 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted),

See e.g., Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 267–68 (1992).
Id.
185 Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 177 (2011).
186 Id. The Court also concluded that “such a reading contradicts the very holding of
Trafficante[.]” Id.
187 Id. at 176–177; see also id. at 177 (Court’s interpretation “avoids the extremity of
equating [statutory standing] with Article III”).
183
184
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while excluding plaintiffs who might technically be injured in an
Article III sense but whose interests are unrelated to the statutory
prohibitions in Title VII. 188

Justice Scalia’s decision in Thompson has the effect of extending the
flawed reasoning of Data Processing and limiting the effect of OregonWashington R.R. and Sanders Bros. Justice Scalia accepted that the APA
itself granted statutory standing when the judicially fabricated zone-ofinterests test has been met. His reasoning was that statutory text similar
to the text of the APA provision was to be read to have that same effect,
without regard to when that statutory text was enacted. 189 Justice Scalia
took no account of the fact that Title VII’s grant of statutory standing
was enacted several years prior to the Data Processing decision. 190 The
Congress enacting that text would have had very good reason to expect
that the Supreme Court would have interpreted the broad grant of the
cause of action in Title VII, in the same way that the Court had
construed the scope of the right of action in Sanders Bros., which had
been interpreted to allow parties suffering Article III injury to bring an
action in federal court. Because it had been accepted and applied by the
Court in previous decisions, that understanding of the broad scope of
statutory standing would hardly have been understood as absurd by
Congress or other actors in the legal system. The Thompson Court
instead reached its own anachronistic conclusion about the scope of the
congressional grant of statutory standing. This judicial limitation on the
scope of statutory standing conflicts directly with Justice Scalia’s claim
in Lexmark International that statutory standing is defined by Congress,
rather than determined by the Court’s own view of the class of proper
plaintiffs. 191
Id. at 177–178.
Id.
190 See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
191 See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 128 (2014)
(quoted supra note 74). Justice Scalia’s conclusion that Congress’s broad textual grant of
Sanders Bros.-type standing resulted in the application of the zone-of-interests test contrasts
sharply with his conclusion in Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997), about the scope of
statutory standing. There, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, considered the scope of statutory
standing provided by the citizen suit provision of the Endangered Species Act. Justice Scalia
wrote that, “[t]he first operative portion of the provision says that ‘any person may commence a
civil suit’—an authorization of remarkable breadth when compared with the language Congress
188
189
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Justice Scalia’s more recent statutory standing decision, Lexmark
International, 192 considered whether a company could pursue a claim
that the counterclaim defendant had violated section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act by its false advertising. 193 Congress had provided in that
section that an action claiming a violation may be brought “in a civil
action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be
damaged by such act.” 194 The district court dismissed Static Control’s
counterclaim, because it concluded that the company “lacked
‘prudential standing’ to bring that claim[.]” 195 The Sixth Circuit reversed

ordinarily uses.” Id. at 164–65. He stated that “Congress legislates against the background of
our prudential standing doctrine, which applies unless it is expressly negated.” Id. at 163
(citation omitted). He concluded, however, that the statutory provision “negates the zone-ofinterests test (or, perhaps more accurately, expands the zone of interests).” Id. at 164. He also
stated that:
Our readiness to take the term “any person” at face value is greatly augmented by
two interrelated considerations: that the overall subject matter of this legislation is
the environment (a matter in which it is common to think all persons have an
interest) and that the obvious purpose of the particular provision in question is to
encourage enforcement by so-called “private attorneys general”—evidenced by its
elimination of the usual amount-in-controversy and diversity-of-citizenship
requirements, its provision for recovery of the costs of litigation (including even
expert witness fees), and its reservation to the Government of a right of first refusal
to pursue the action initially and a right to intervene later.
Id. at 165. He also stated that, given the broad statutory text, “there is no textual basis for saying
that its expansion of standing requirements applies to environmentalists alone.” Id. at 166.
192 Lexmark Int’l, 572 U.S. 118.
193 See id. at 120–122. The Lanham Act provision is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). Lexmark
had brought an action against Static Control Components (Static Control) alleging that the
company had violated the Copyright Act and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act by
supplying components for use in refurbishing computer printer cartridges; Static Control
brought its counterclaim in that action alleging that Lexmark International had violated the
Lanham Act. Id. at 122.
194 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2018) (emphasis added).
195 Lexmark Int’l, 572 U.S. at 123. The district court reached this conclusion based on its
application of the test for prudential standing that it had “attributed to Associated Gen.
Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983).” Id.; see also id. at 123–24 (“The
court emphasized that there were more direct plaintiffs in the form of remanufacturers of
Lexmark’s cartridges; that Static Control’s injury was remot[e] because it was a mere byproduct
of the supposed manipulation of consumers’ relationships with remanufacturers; and that
Lexmark’s alleged intent [was] to dry up spent cartridge supplies at the remanufacturing level,
rather than at [Static Control]’s supply level, making remanufacturers Lexmark’s alleged
intended target.”) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
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that decision after it applied a different, “reasonable-interest test” to
determine whether Static Control could bring the Lanham Act claim. 196
There was general agreement that Static Control had Article III standing
to bring the claim. 197
Justice Scalia began his analysis for the Court by revising the
terminology that applies to the question of whether a party with Article
III standing may bring an action in federal court. This analysis,
described above, 198 led to an understanding that this was a question to
be resolved by Congress and how Congress defined the scope of
statutory standing, rather than how a court views the proper prudential
limits on jurisdiction. 199 Justice Scalia therefore acknowledged that “this
case presents a straightforward question of statutory interpretation:
Does the cause of action in § 1125(a) extend to plaintiffs like Static
Control?” 200
The Court’s resolution of the interpretive question began with the
relevant text, which defines in exceptionally broad terms parties who are
authorized to bring suit: “The statute authorizes suit by ‘any person who
believes that he or she is likely to be damaged’ by a defendant’s false
advertising.” 201 This text was enacted in 1946202—a date after the Court’s
decisions in Oregon-Washington R.R. and Sanders Bros. Justice Scalia
barely assessed the meaning of the text, which permits an action to be
brought by “any person who believes that he or she is likely to be
damaged” by the prohibited conduct. That language, of course, would
be subject to the usual constitutional-avoidance canon, 203 so that any
potential statutory claimant would be required to demonstrate Article
III standing in order to avoid having to adjudicate the constitutionality
of the provision, which on its face does not require an injury in fact, an
See id. at 124. This test had been used by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. See id.
See id. at 125–26 (“Lexmark does not deny that Static Control’s allegations of lost sales
and damage to its business reputation give it standing under Article III to press its falseadvertising claim, and we are satisfied that they do.”).
198 See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
199 See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
200 Lexmark Int’l, 572 U.S. at 128–30.
201 Id. (citation omitted).
202 The text was originally included in Ch. 540 (July 5, 1946), Tit. VIII § 43, 60 Stat. 441.
203 See, e.g., Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804) (application of
constitutional avoidance canon).
196
197
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irreducible minimum requirement of Article III. 204 Justice Scalia
presented only his understated view that “[r]ead literally, that broad
language might suggest that an action is available to anyone who can
satisfy the minimum requirements of Article III.” 205 This is an
understatement, of course, because the text does not “literally” require
an inquiry into whether the claimant suffered an injury in fact, but
requires only the claimant’s “belie[f] that he or she is likely to be
damaged” by the statutory violation. 206 Justice Scalia accordingly moved
on quickly from the plain meaning of the text, remarking that “[n]o
party makes that argument, however, and the ‘unlikelihood that
Congress meant to allow all factually injured plaintiffs to recover
persuades us that [§ 1125(a)] should not get such an expansive
reading.’” 207 This statement is curious because, rather than determine
the meaning of the text, Justice Scalia states concern for what Congress
“meant,” which is simply another way of inquiring into (or stating a
conclusion about) Congress’s intent. Such reasoning, of course, violates
the Holmesian principle that an interpreter should not ask what the
legislators meant, but what the words mean to a common reader of the
text. 208 Justice Scalia has famously given his strong support to this
principle. 209 The statement is also surely wrong about “what Congress
meant” when it enacted this provision. Congress would have been aware
at the time of enactment of the Lanham Act in 1946 210 that the Court

204 A party must have Article III standing in order to bring a claim as an aggrieved party.
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
205 Lexmark Int’l, 572 U.S. at 128–30 (emphasis added).
206 Id. (emphasis added). That language might be interpreted to require the claimant
demonstrate Article III standing in order to avoid having to adjudicate the constitutionality of
the provision. See Murray, 6 U.S. at 118 (application of constitutional avoidance canon).
207 Lexmark Int’l, 572 U.S. at 128–30 (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotations
omitted). This is similar to the rhetorical point he made in Thompson, 562 U.S. 170, 175–77
(2011), when he rejected the broad construction that the statutory text appeared to compel
because of unidentified absurd results.
208 See Holmes, supra note 27, at 419 (“We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask
only what the statute means.”).
209 See, e.g., Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 618 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (“Whether governing rules are made by the national legislature or
an administrative agency, we are bound by what they say, not by the unexpressed intention of
those who made them.”).
210 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2018), see also supra note 193.
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had given very similar, though narrower, text the broadest
interpretation in Oregon-Washington R.R. 211 and Sanders Bros. 212
Justice Scalia then proceeded to construe the broad textual grant of
statutory standing “in light of two relevant background principles . . . :
zone of interests and proximate causality.” 213 Regarding zone of
interests, which of course was never understood as a legal test until
Justice Douglas fabricated it in 1970, Justice Scalia opined that “we
presume that a statutory cause of action extends only to plaintiffs whose
interests ‘fall within the zone of interests protected by the law
invoked.’” 214 He then provocatively described the zone-of-interests test
“as a limitation on the cause of action for judicial review conferred by
the [APA].” 215 This description is provocative for two reasons. First, as
we have seen, Justice Douglas in Data Processing fashioned the zone-ofinterests test to give effect to the Court’s flawed view that the APA had
itself provided statutory standing, rather than requiring that courts look
to the scope of statutory standing that Congress had defined in other
statutes to determine whether APA standing was present. 216 Second,
Justice Douglas believed that he was reading the APA’s grant of
statutory standing generously, rather than as “a limitation.” 217
The Lexmark International Court then stated that the zone-ofinterests test “applies to all statutorily created causes of action,” 218
“‘unless it is expressly negated.’” 219 Indeed, Congress would have to
accomplish that negation by the use of statutory text even clearer than
the quite clear and exceptionally broad text of the Lanham Act provision
defining statutory standing, because Justice Scalia then concluded that
“[t]he zone-of-interests test is therefore an appropriate tool for
determining who may invoke the cause of action in § 1125(a).” 220 This
requirement was imposed despite the fact that the provision had been
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220

288 U.S. 14 (1933).
309 U.S. 470 (1940).
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 129 (2014).
Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
See supra notes 140–50 and accompanying text.
See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
Lexmark Int’l, 572 U.S. at 129.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 130 (citation omitted).
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enacted in 1946 and twenty five years would have to pass before anyone
would even have heard of a zone-of-interests test. Moreover, acting in
1946, Congress would have understood how broadly the Court had
construed similar statutory language in Oregon-Washington R.R. 221 and
Sanders Bros. 222
Justice Scalia’s interpretive strategy here conflicted with
textualism’s claim to be an objective interpretive method. 223 He relied,
instead, on the application of a decisive background rule against which
Congress legislates that determines a narrow interpretive result that is
more attractive to the Court, notwithstanding very clear and very broad
text. 224 Perhaps because he may have felt uncomfortable defining so
pervasive a background presumption for the scope of a congressionally
created cause of action, Justice Scalia included a footnote in which he
opined that the zone-of-interests test, although recognized in Data
Processing at a relatively late date, had “roots” in the common law of
torts. 225 He asserted that “[s]tatutory causes of action are regularly
interpreted to incorporate standard common law limitations on civil
liability—the zone-of-interests test no less than the requirement of
proximate causation.” 226 We will evaluate here the application of the
zone-of-interests test and discuss in the next Part the application of the
proximate cause limitation.
Justice Scalia attempts in this footnote to bolster his decision that
the zone-of-interests test is to be applied, along with the proximate
cause test, to a claimant asserting a false advertising claim under the
Lanham Act, notwithstanding its exceptionally broad 1946 text. He
finds that the common law “roots” of the zone-of-interests test “lie in
the common-law rule that a plaintiff may not recover under the law of
negligence for injuries caused by violation of a statute unless the statute
is interpreted as designed to protect the class of persons in which the
plaintiff is included, against the risk of the type of harm which has in

288 U.S. 14 (1933).
309 U.S. 470 (1940).
223 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
224 Justice Scalia’s penchant for such rules is discussed infra at notes 352–56 and
accompanying text.
225 Lexmark Int’l, 572 U.S. at 130 n.5.
226 Id. (citation omitted).
221
222
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fact occurred as a result of its violation.” 227 This is a curious argument
for two reasons. First, the zone-of-interests test has never inquired into
whether the legislature, that is Congress, sought to benefit a particular
group that includes the plaintiff by the enactment of the provision that
has allegedly been violated. 228 This type of analysis would have been
appropriate in deciding whether the plaintiff has the other type of
statutory standing based on the existence of a legal interest established
by the statute. 229
More importantly, Justice Scalia’s argument here conflicts directly
with the evolution of the law of statutory standing. As we have seen, the
common law did directly affect this area of the law by forming the basis
for the requirement that a party demonstrate a legal injury in order to
bring a statutory claim. 230 Congress itself, of course, defined the other
basis for statutory standing, granting the right to assert a claim to any
“person aggrieved,” in order to extend the right to seek review of
government action that is claimed to be unlawful. 231 This purely
statutory basis for a plaintiff’s right of action was recognized by the
Court in Oregon-Washington R.R. 232 and Sanders Bros. 233 and reiterated
by Congress in § 702 of the APA. The Court acting through Justice
Douglas remade this law in 1971. More than forty years later, Justice
Scalia extended the Court’s reshaping of this area of the law by refusing
to accept Congress’s broad grant of statutory standing and rationalizing
the result by claiming that the Court was simply recognizing common
law limits on the right to bring an action that the legislature understood
to be in place. To claim that this interpretation respects what Justice
Scalia asserts to be the determinative role of the legislature in defining
the scope of statutory standing is laughable.

Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
See infra notes 279–80 and accompanying text.
229 See supra notes 215–16 and accompanying text.
230 See supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text.
231 See supra notes 173–74 and accompanying text.
232 288 U.S. 14 (1933).
233 309 U.S. 470 (1940). Indeed, the Court’s pre-APA construction of the “person aggrieved”
provision was that broader standing had to be recognized in order to give legal effect to the
legislature’s inclusion of provisions granting such standing. Justice Scalia has now turned this
history on its head by reintroducing common law limits into the grant of statutory standing by
Congress by means of these “person aggrieved” provisions.
227
228
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Evaluating the Victory of the Zone-of-Interests Test As the Default
Standard for Statutory Standing

Before proceeding to an analysis of the evolving application of the
now-pervasive zone-of-interests test, an evaluation of the improbably
broad applicability of the zone-of-interests tests is appropriate. How is
one to explain the passing strange alignment of the two Supreme Court
Justices, who stand at either end of the Court’s application of the test.
Justice Douglas, the famous New Deal liberal who initially fabricated the
test, is now half of a surprising pair along with Justice Scalia, the
equally-famous contemporary conservative, who then extended the
scope of application of this test. How is it that they each emerged as a
supporter of a test that the Court fabricated out of whole cloth of its
own making to determine a claimant’s right to bring an action defined
by the legislature?
The role of Justice Douglas in defining this law is easier to
understand. Concerned that expert administrative agencies had been
captured by the industries that they were empowered to regulate, Justice
Douglas hoped to expand standing for parties wanting to challenge
agency action in court 234 and he was happy to end the application of the
legal interest test, which he viewed as overly narrow. 235 He also criticized
the legal interest test, because he believed that the test conflated the issue
of statutory standing with the merits of the plaintiff’s claim. He wanted
those issues to be separate. 236 Finally, Justice Douglas likely preferred to
interpret § 702 of the APA so that the provision directly provided
standing for a wide range of claimants, rather than having to rely on the
provisions of another statute to establish statutory standing.

234 See JOHN M. ROGERS, MICHAEL P. HEALY & RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 659 (3d ed. 2013).
235 See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 153, 153 n.1 (1970)
(“[T]he existence or non-existence of a ‘legal interest’ is a matter quite distinct from the
problem of standing.” (citation omitted)); id. at 153 (“The ‘legal interest’ test goes to the merits.
The question of standing is different.”).
236 Justice Scalia has expressed some support for separating the standing analysis from the
merits of a case. See Pfander, supra note 77, at 96 (Justice Scalia “called for the separation of
jurisdiction and merits, distinguishing statutes that specify the elements of a cause of action and
the available remedies from those that confer jurisdiction.”).

Healy.40.6.5 (Do Not Delete)

2019]

7/15/2019 4:47 PM

JUSTICE SCALIA’S TEXTUALISM

2911

Justice Scalia’s acceptance of the broad presumptive application of
the zone-of-interests test is harder to understand. First, his two recent
decisions have the effect of aligning him with the judicial activism of
Justice Douglas. Justice Scalia is also associated with strong support for a
narrow scope of Article III standing. 237 Why would Justice Scalia
support a test defined by Justice Douglas to provide expansive statutory
standing if Justice Scalia generally preferred to limit standing to sue?
The issue of statutory standing, of course, does not arise if Article III
standing is lacking. Perhaps for Justice Scalia, if Article III proved
effective in limiting standing for plaintiffs, there was less reason to be
concerned about the scope of statutory standing. Also, Justice Scalia’s
use of the absurdity canon indicates that, while Justice Scalia had
worked to narrow the scope of Article III standing, he believed the scope
of standing continued to be overly broad and other, new standing limits
must be found.
Moreover, an understanding of Justice Scalia’s position requires
emphasis of the fact that one consequence of the zone-of-interests test is
that its only legal effect would be to constrain statutory standing in
comparison to the scope of statutory standing defined by Congress in
statutory text that allows any aggrieved party or any party claiming to be
aggrieved to bring an action. In short, Justice Scalia has engaged in a
stealthy narrowing of standing compared to where textualism would
have been expected to lead him. The decision also provides a new
example of Justice Scalia’s ability to shape the interpretive rules of
textualism that permitted him, when needed, to ignore clear text and
reach his preferred interpretative result. He had already famously
developed a rule of clear statement to limit the power that agencies may
exercise. 238 In these statutory standing decisions, he relied on the
claimed background understandings of congressional action to ensure
that the zone-of-interests test applies in the place of Congress’s grant in
the statutory text of the broadest possible statutory standing (i.e., those
237 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
238 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (“Congress . . . does
not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisionsit does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”). This canon is discussed and
criticized in ROGERS, HEALY & KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 234, at 684–86, and Healy,
Legislative Intent, supra note 31, at 415–16.
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able to demonstrate Article III standing). These are impressive successes
for a textualist who purports to apply only the meaning of the words
enacted by Congress. 239 Justice Scalia accomplished these limits on the
scope of statutory standing defined by Congress, at the same time that
he was redefining the legal question as one of statutory standing and
purporting to reject the authority of the judiciary to limit the statutory
standing defined by Congress based on the judiciary’s sense of
prudence. 240 This was, in short, an interpretive effort that belied the
claims of the interpretive approach championed by Justice Scalia.
In the next Part, we will consider another reason why Justice
Scalia’s acceptance of a test crafted by Justice Douglas is more
understandable.
IV. JUSTICE SCALIA’S CHANGED APPLICATION OF THE ZONE-OFINTERESTS TEST: TEACHING THE OLD DOG NEW TRICKS
We saw in the last Part how Justice Scalia broadened the scope of
application of the zone-of-interests test. Justice Scalia’s decisions
established that the zone-of-interests test is the presumptive test for
statutory standing under all federal statutes, unless Congress has defined
an alternative rule for standing with exceptional clarity in the text of the
statute. 241 We turn now to consider how Justice Scalia began the work of
changing how the zone-of-interests test is applied in order to narrow the
scope of what Justice Douglas had viewed as a very broad grant of
statutory standing. In order to understand Justice Scalia’s motives and
methods regarding the content of the zone-of-interests test, we must
first describe briefly how the Supreme Court traditionally applied the
test and how the application of the test became problematic with the
Court’s use of the textualist method for statutory interpretation.

239 The second irony is that Justice Scalia has accepted a test for statutory standing that does
not work well with textualism, rather than intentionalism, which was the dominant interpretive
method when Justice Douglas articulated the test.
240 See supra Part II.
241 See supra notes 213–16 and accompanying text.
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The Problem of Textualism and the Zone-of-Interests Tests
The Non-Textualist Foundation for the Zone-of-Interests Test

As has been discussed, Justice Douglas defined the zone-ofinterests test in his decision in Data Processing. 242 Because the test was
freshly minted, Data Processing itself was the first example of how the
new test would apply. The Court’s discussion of this issue was limited
and relied on the analysis of a lower court:
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held in Arnold Tours, Inc.
v. Camp, 408 F.2d 1147, 1153, that by reason of § 4 a data processing
company has standing to contest the legality of a national bank
performing data processing services for other banks and bank
customers:
“Section 4 had a broader purpose than regulating only the
service corporations. It was also a response to the fears
expressed by a few senators, that without such a prohibition, the
bill would have enabled ‘banks to engage in a nonbanking
activity,’ S. Rep. No. 2105, (87th Cong., 2d Sess., 7-12)
(Supplemental views of Senators Proxmire, Douglas, and
Neuberger), and thus constitute ‘a serious exception to the
accepted public policy which strictly limits banks to banking.’
(Supplemental views of Senators Muskie and Clark). We think
Congress has provided the sufficient statutory aid to standing
even though the competition may not be the precise kind
Congress legislated against.”
We do not put the issue in those words, for they implicate the merits.
We do think, however, that § 4 arguably brings a competitor within
the zone of interests protected by it. 243

The Court accordingly was comfortable looking outside of the text
to determine whether the plaintiff was arguably within the zone of
interests. 244

242
243

See supra notes 234–37 and accompanying text.
Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 155–56 (1970).
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On the same day that the Court decided Data Processing, the Court
decided Barlow v. Collins, 245 a case in which the Court also applied its
new zone-of-interests test. There, the Court reviewed a decision in
which the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of an action brought
by tenant farmers who sought review of Department of Agriculture
regulations that limited the ability of the farmers to assign upland
cotton payments to be made by the government. 246
The Court decided that “the tenant farmers are clearly within the
zone of interests protected by the Act.” 247 The basis for this conclusion
was the Court’s conclusion that there was “congressional intent that the
Secretary protect the interests of tenant farmers,” which the Court
found to be “[i]mplicit in the statutory provisions and their legislative
history.” 248 The Court relied upon two statutory provisions 249 and
“sparse” legislative history to determine that Congress had that intent. 250
The Court returned to the application of the zone-of-interests test
in Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass’n. 251 There, a group of securities
brokers and dealers challenged a regulation by the Comptroller of the
Currency that authorized national banks to provide securities brokerage
services at their non-branch locations. 252 The Comptroller’s position
was that the plaintiff lacked statutory standing to bring the claim
because the statute the plaintiff claimed had been violated protected the
interests of state and federal banks, rather than dealers or brokers of
244 See also id. at 157 (“Both Acts are clearly ‘relevant’ statutes within the meaning of § 702.
The Acts do not in terms protect a specified group. But their general policy is apparent; and
those whose interests are directly affected by a broad or narrow interpretation of the Acts are
easily identifiable. It is clear that petitioners, as competitors of national banks which are
engaging in data processing services, are within that class of ‘aggrieved’ persons who, under
§ 702, are entitled to judicial review of ‘agency action.’”) (emphasis added). Justice Douglas’s
willingness to construe a broad grant of statutory standing in § 702 is consistent with his
recognition of implied rights of action under federal statutes defining only a rule of primary
conduct. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (Clark, J., for the Court) (Section
14(a) of the 1934 Securities Act). Cf. Clearfield Tr. Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
245 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
246 See id. at 160–61.
247 Id. at 164–65.
248 Id. at 164.
249 See id.
250 Id. at 164–65.
251 479 U.S. 388 (1987).
252 See id. at 392.
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securities. 253 The Court concluded that the plaintiff did have statutory
standing based on “the purposes implicit in the statute,” 254 and the
“infer[ence] that Congress ‘intended petitioner’s class of plaintiffs to be
relied upon to challenge agency disregard of the law.’” 255
These early applications of the zone-of-interests test are reflected in
Justice Douglas’s unexpected decision in Data Processing that the APA
itself had defined a broad scope of statutory standing. 256 The broad
scope of that standing was to be discerned by considering Congress’s
intent and purpose in enacting the statutory provisions that the plaintiff
claimed had been violated. Justice Scalia, who, as we have seen, rejected
broad standing, 257 also rejected the interpretation of statutes based on
legislative intent, 258 and rejected the interpretation of statutes based on
purpose, 259 would be expected to have been doubtful at best about all
three of these aspects of the zone-of-interests test.
It is notable that Justice Scalia had sought, soon after Clarke, to
describe the potential limits of the scope of APA statutory standing. In
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 260 Justice Scalia, writing for the
Court, included a well-known explanation that a party will not be within
a statute’s zone of interests when the party is a mere incidental
beneficiary of a statutory requirement: “Thus, for example, the failure of
an agency to comply with a statutory provision requiring ‘on the record’
hearings would assuredly have an adverse effect upon the company that
has the contract to record and transcribe the agency’s proceedings; but
since the provision was obviously enacted to protect the interests of the

See id. at 393.
Id. at 399. Justice Stevens wrote a concurring opinion that was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor. He agreed that the brokers had standing based on “the
multiple purposes behind the branch banking restrictions.” Id. at 416 (Stevens, J. concurring).
He concluded that, “[j]ust as the Court found in Association of Data Processing Service
Organizations and Arnold Tours, there is embodied in the antibranching rule of the McFadden
Act a congressional purpose to protect competitors of national banks in order to ensure that
national banks remain limited entities.” Id.
255 Id. at 403 (internal quotations, brackets, and citations omitted).
256 See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
257 See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
258 See infra Section IV.A.2.
259 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
260 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
253
254
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parties to the proceedings and not those of the reporters, that company
would not be ‘adversely affected within the meaning’ of the statute.” 261
In Air Courier Conference of America, 262 the Court, in a decision by
Chief Justice Rehnquist (and joined by Justice Scalia), applied the zoneof-interests test and concluded that the plaintiff postal workers union
lacked statutory standing under the APA. The Union had challenged as
unlawful under the Postal Express Statutes (PES) the decision of the
Postal Service to permit international remailing by private carriers. 263
The conclusion that the Union had Article III standing because the rule
would harm union employment had not been appealed. 264 The Court
understood that its determination of whether the plaintiff had statutory
standing depended on the intent of Congress: “We must inquire then, as
to Congress’ intent in enacting the PES in order to determine whether
postal workers were meant to be within the zone of interests protected
by those statutes.” 265
To discern that intent, the Court looked first at the statutory text
and concluded that “[t]he particular language of the statutes provides no
support for respondents’ assertion that Congress intended to protect
jobs with the Postal Service.” 266 The Court then considered “the history
of this legislation.” 267 The history reviewed by the Court included both a
summary of statutes dating back to “the first statutes limiting private
carriage of letters on post roads [] enacted in 1792,” and a committee
report and floor statements, 268 the stuff of traditional legislative history.
This review convinced the Court that “[t]he postal monopoly [] exists to
ensure that postal services will be provided to the citizenry at large, and
not to secure employment for postal workers.” 269
The Court also reviewed the legislative history of the Postal
Reorganization Act (PRA), 270 which had reenacted the PES and had
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270

Id. at 883 (citation omitted).
498 U.S. 517 (1991).
See id. at 519–21.
See id. at 524.
Id. at 524.
Id. at 524–25 (citation omitted).
Id. at 526.
See id. at 526–27.
Id. at 528.
Pub. L. No. 91-375, 84 Stat. 719 (1970).
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contained provisions addressing the relationship between the Postal
Service and its workers. 271 The Court concluded that, “[n]one of the
documents constituting the PRA legislative history suggest that those
concerned with postal reforms saw any connection between the PES and
the provisions of the PRA dealing with labor-management relations.” 272
In sum, the Court continued to ground its application of the zoneof-interests test in its judgment about whether Congress intended (or
had the purpose) to protect, at least arguably, the interests that the
plaintiff was asserting in support of its claim for relief. Discerning that
intent or purpose was accomplished by considering the text and the
legislative history of the statute at issue. In the case of the PES, the Court
found that Congress had not acted, even arguably, to protect the
interests of Postal Service employees.
2.

Textualism and the Zone-of-Interests Test

We have seen that Justice Scalia played the key role in the
emergence of the modern focus on statutory text, rather than legislative
intent or purpose, as the basis for interpreting statutes. 273 The textualist
method has now been employed in the application of the zone-ofinterests test and the arguable result has been broader statutory
standing, a result that Justice Douglas may have lauded, but that would
likely have concerned Justice Scalia.
Justice Scalia wrote the Court’s opinion in Bennett v. Spear. 274
There, the Court found that the zone-of-interests test applied to
determine whether the plaintiff had statutory standing to bring an
action “alleg[ing] a violation of § 7 of the [Endangered Species Act
(ESA)], 16 U.S.C. § 1536, which requires, inter alia, that each agency
‘use the best scientific and commercial data available,’ § 1536(a)(2).”275
The plaintiffs claimed that the agency had violated this requirement
when it issued a Biological Opinion that contained findings used to
support a decision that minimum lake water levels were necessary to
271
272
273
274
275

See Air Courier, 498 U.S. at 527–30.
Id. at 530.
See supra Part I.
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
Id. at 176.
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avoid “a detrimental impact on the endangered suckers.” 276 Justice
Scalia did not consult the legislative history and instead simply stated
his inference that,
The obvious purpose of the requirement that each agency “use
the best scientific and commercial data available” is to ensure
that the ESA not be implemented haphazardly, on the basis of
speculation or surmise. While this no doubt serves to advance
the ESA’s overall goal of species preservation, we think it
readily apparent that another objective (if not indeed the
primary one) is to avoid needless economic dislocation
produced by agency officials zealously but unintelligently
pursuing their environmental objectives. 277
Justice Scalia supported his inference about the “obvious purpose”
of the best scientific evidence provision by employing the classic
textualist whole act canon and discussing a different provision of the
ESA: 278
That economic consequences are an explicit concern of the ESA is
evidenced by § 1536(h), which provides exemption from
§ 1536(a)(2)’s no-jeopardy mandate where there are no reasonable
and prudent alternatives to the agency action and the benefits of the
agency action clearly outweigh the benefits of any alternatives. We
believe the “best scientific and commercial data” provision is
similarly intended, at least in part, to prevent uneconomic (because
erroneous) jeopardy determinations. Petitioners’ claim that they are
victims of such a mistake is plainly within the zone of interests that
the provision protects. 279

To be sure, Justice Scalia did state that the “provision is similarly
intended.” 280 This language, however, must be inadvertent, given Justice
Scalia’s hostility toward grounding interpretation on congressional
intent. 281
276
277
278
279
280
281

Id.
Id. at 176–77.
See supra notes 273–76 and accompanying text.
520 U.S. at 177.
Id.
See supra notes 31–44 and accompanying text.
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Justice Scalia’s aversion to the consideration of legislative intent,
rather than simply consideration of text, in the context of the zone-ofinterests test can be seen in the Court’s next decision applying the test in
an APA case. In National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) v. First
National Bank & Trust Co., 282 the Court considered whether the plaintiff
banks had statutory standing under § 702 to challenge a regulation
promulgated by the NCUA that had changed its interpretation of the
common bond requirement to allow credit unions to provide services to
additional customers.
Justice Thomas wrote the opinion for the Court, which was joined
by Justice Scalia “except as to footnote 6.” 283 That footnote had briefly
discussed the legislative history of the provision that the plaintiff
claimed had been violated. 284 Justice Thomas stated that, “in applying
the ‘zone of interests’ test, we do not ask whether, in enacting the
statutory provision at issue, Congress specifically intended to benefit the
plaintiff. Instead, we first discern the interests ‘arguably . . . to be
protected’ by the statutory provision at issue; we then inquire whether
the plaintiff’s interests affected by the agency action in question are
among them.” 285 Justice Thomas considered the “express terms” of the
provision at issue:
§ 09 limits membership in every federal credit union to members of
definable “groups.” Because federal credit unions may, as a general
matter, offer banking services only to members, see, e.g., 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1757(5)-(6), § 109 also restricts the markets that every federal
credit union can serve. Although these markets need not be small,
they unquestionably are limited. The link between § 109’s regulation
of federal credit union membership and its limitation on the markets
that federal credit unions can serve is unmistakable. Thus, even if it
cannot be said that Congress had the specific purpose of benefiting
commercial banks, one of the interests “arguably . . . to be protected”
by § 109 is an interest in limiting the markets that federal credit
unions can serve. This interest is precisely the interest of respondents
affected by the NCUA’s interpretation of § 109. As competitors of
282
283
284
285

522 U.S. 479 (1998).
Id. at 482.
See id. at 493 n.6.
Id. at 492.
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federal credit unions, respondents certainly have an interest in
limiting the markets that federal credit unions can serve, and the
NCUA’s interpretation has affected that interest by allowing federal
credit unions to increase their customer base. 286

In short, the Court’s application of the test of statutory standing
followed from the Court’s inference, as in Bennett, about the reasons for
and the interests that would (arguably) be protected by the statutory
provision. The application did not depend on an investigation into
Congress’s intent when it enacted the statutory provision.
Justice O’Connor’s dissent on behalf of four Justices opined that
“the Court applies the [zone-of-interests] test in a manner that is
contrary to our decisions and, more importantly, that all but eviscerates
the zone-of-interests requirement.”287 In Justice O’Connor’s view, the
Court’s application was “contrary” and “quite different,” because the
Court “eschew[ed] any assessment of whether the common bond
provision was intended to protect respondents’ commercial interest.” 288
Justice O’Connor explained that the Court instead had pursued a
textualist approach, which considered “the terms of the common bond
provision” 289 and the “citing [of] other statutory provisions.” 290 She
stated that, based on the statutory text, the majority “reasons that one
interest sought to be protected by the common bond provision is an
interest in limiting the markets that federal credit unions can serve.” 291
The “crux” of this approach, in Justice O’Connor’s view, “is simply that
the plaintiff must ‘have’ an interest in enforcing the pertinent statute.”292
She warned that “every litigant who establishes injury in fact under
Article III will automatically satisfy the zone-of-interests requirement,
rendering the zone-of-interests test ineffectual” 293 in constraining the
286 Id. at 492–94 (footnotes omitted). In footnote 6, the four concurring Justices concluded
that the legislative history of § 109 demonstrates that “one of the interests ‘arguably . . . to be
protected’ by § 109 is an interest in limiting the markets that federal credit unions can serve.”
Id. at 493.
287 Id. at 503 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
288 Id. at 503–05.
289 Id.
290 Id.
291 Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
292 Id. at 506.
293 Id. (citation omitted).
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scope of statutory standing based on congressional intent. Justice
O’Connor stated that the Court’s new approach would change the
conclusion about the hypothetical that Justice Scalia had presented in
National Wildlife Federation: “Under the Court’s approach today,
however, the reporting company would have standing under the zoneof-interests test: Because the company is injured by the failure to comply
with the requirement of on-the-record hearings, the company would
certainly ‘have’ an interest in enforcing the statute.” 294 Later in the
dissent, Justice O’Connor strengthened her view that the majority had
changed the zone-of-interests test by its textualist method and failure to
evaluate seriously the intent of Congress: “The pertinent question under
the zone-of-interests test is whether Congress intended to protect
certain interests through a particular provision, not whether,
irrespective of congressional intent, a provision may have the effect of
protecting those interests.” 295
Justice O’Connor conducted what she believed was the required
inquiry into congressional intent. 296 She concluded:
[N]either the terms of the common bond provision, nor the way in
which the provision operates, nor the circumstances surrounding its
enactment[] evince a congressional desire to legislate against
competition. This, then, is an action the plaintiff’s interests are so
marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the
statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended
to permit the suit. The zone-of-interests test seeks to exclude those
plaintiffs whose suits are more likely to frustrate than to further
statutory objectives, and one can readily envision circumstances in
which the interests of competitors, who have the incentive to
suppress credit union expansion in all circumstances, would be at
odds with the statute’s general aim of supporting the growth of credit
unions that are cohesive and hence financially stable. 297

Id. at 507.
Id. at 516 (citations omitted).
296 See id. at 513–17.
297 Id. at 517 (quotations and citations omitted). See id. at 518 (“[T]he most that can be said
is that the provision has the incidental effect of benefiting the plaintiffs. That was not enough to
establish standing in Air Courier, and it should not suffice here.”).
294
295
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In sum, the Court’s decision in NCUA demonstrates how the
textualist method has the apparent effect of broadening the scope of
statutory standing under the zone-of-interests test.
In a more recent decision, Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of
Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 298 the Roberts Court applied the zoneof-interests test again using the textualist method and found broad
standing. There, the Court considered whether the plaintiff, an owner of
property near lands purchased by the federal government in trust for a
Tribe, had statutory standing to challenge the purchase. The Secretary of
the Interior had acted under section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act
(IRA). 299 That provision grants authority to the Secretary of the Interior
to obtain property “for the purpose of providing land for Indians.”300
The plaintiff brought the action under the APA. 301
The district court dismissed the suit, because the court concluded
that “Patchak lacked prudential standing to challenge the Secretary’s
acquisition of the Bradley Property. The court reasoned that the injuries
Patchak alleged fell outside § 465’s ‘zone of interests.’” 302 The Interior
Department and the Tribe argued that the plaintiff lacked statutory
standing because “the relationship between § 465 and Patchak’s asserted
interests is insufficient. That is so, they contend, because the statute
focuses on land acquisition, whereas Patchak’s interests relate to the
land’s use as a casino.”303
The Court introduced its analysis of the statutory standing issue by
stressing that the zone-of-interests test does not greatly limit such
standing for a plaintiff bringing an APA action:
567 U.S. 209 (2012).
Ch. 576, § 5, 73 Pub. L. No. 383, 48 Stat. 985 (1934) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 5101–5129 (2012)).
300 25 U.S.C. § 5108 (formerly codified at § 465).
301 See Patchak, 567 U.S. 209; see also id. at 212–15 (Patchak, the plaintiff, “requested only a
declaration that the decision to acquire the land violated the IRA and an injunction to stop the
Secretary from accepting title.”) (citation omitted).
302 Id. at 213–15 (citation omitted). The district court decision on statutory standing was
reversed by the court of appeals. See id. The Court also considered in the case the issue of the
waiver of sovereign immunity, which implicated the claimed application of the Quiet Title Act.
See id. at 213–22. Justice Sotomayor dissented on the ground that there was no waiver of
sovereign immunity. The Court’s consideration of this question is beyond the scope of this
article.
303 Id. at 224–25 (citations omitted).
298
299
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The prudential standing test Patchak must meet “is not meant to be
especially demanding.” Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., 479 U.S.
388, 399 (1987). We apply the test in keeping with Congress’s
“evident intent” when enacting the APA “to make agency action
presumptively reviewable.” Ibid. We do not require any “indication
of congressional purpose to benefit the would-be plaintiff.” Id., at
399–400. And we have always conspicuously included the word
“arguably” in the test to indicate that the benefit of any doubt goes to
the plaintiff. The test forecloses suit only when a plaintiff’s “interests
are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit
in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress
intended to permit the suit.” 304

The Court also described the test as focused on the “issues”
implicated by the provision that the plaintiff claims has been violated:
“The question is not whether § 465 seeks to benefit Patchak; everyone
can agree it does not. The question is instead, as the Band’s and the
Government’s main argument acknowledges, whether issues of land use
(arguably) fall within § 465’s scope—because if they do, a neighbor
complaining about such use may sue to enforce the statute’s limits.” 305
The Court then considered the “context and purpose” of § 465, 306
and stated that the provision “functions as a primary mechanism to
foster Indian tribes’ economic development.” 307 In the Court’s view,
“when the Secretary obtains land for Indians under § 465, she does not
do so in a vacuum. Rather, she takes title to properties with at least one
eye directed toward how tribes will use those lands to support economic
development.” 308
The Court found that the provision’s concern with the use of the
lands being purchased is made “crystal clear” by the Department’s
regulations, 309 which “show that the statute’s implementation centrally
depends on the projected use of a given property.” 310 The Court also
304
305
306
307
308
309
310

Id. (footnote omitted).
Id. at 225 n.7 (citation omitted).
Id. at 226.
Id.
Id.
Id. (discussing 40 C.F.R. § 151).
Id.
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concluded that the Department’s decision to purchase the property at
issue in Patchak “from start to finish . . . involved questions of land
use.” 311
The final step in the Court’s analysis was to relate the “issues” or
“interests” implicated by the provision that Patchak had claimed was
violated to the interests being asserted by the plaintiff:
And because § 465’s implementation encompasses these issues, the
interests Patchak raises—at least arguably—fall “within the
zone . . . protected or regulated by the statute.” If the Government
had violated a statute specifically addressing how federal land can be
used, no one would doubt that a neighboring landowner would have
prudential standing to bring suit to enforce the statute’s limits. The
difference here, as the Government and Band point out, is that § 465
specifically addresses only land acquisition. But for the reasons
already given, decisions under the statute are closely enough and
often enough entwined with considerations of land use to make that
difference immaterial. As in this very case, the Secretary will typically
acquire land with its eventual use in mind, after assessing potential
conflicts that use might create. See 25 CFR §§ 151.10(c), 151.10(f),
151.11(a). And so neighbors to the use (like Patchak) are
reasonable—indeed, predictable—challengers of the Secretary’s
decisions: Their interests, whether economic, environmental, or
aesthetic, come within § 465’s regulatory ambit. 312

The Court’s method of analysis in Patchak thus conformed to the
method of analysis the Court had defined in NCUA. 313 There, the Court
stated that, “in applying the ‘zone of interests’ test, we do not ask
whether, in enacting the statutory provision at issue, Congress
specifically intended to benefit the plaintiff. Instead, we first discern the
interests ‘arguably . . . to be protected’ by the statutory provision at
issue; we then inquire whether the plaintiff’s interests affected by the
agency action in question are among them.” 314 To be sure, the Court in

311
312
313
314

Id.
Id. at 226–28.
Nat’l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co., 522 U.S. 479 (1998).
Id. at 492.
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Patchak did refer to the purpose of the statutory provision. 315 Justice
Thomas had made the same reference in NCUA. 316 The Court did not,
however, inquire into the intent of Congress through a consideration of
the legislative history.
B.

Justice Scalia’s New Content for the Zone-of-Interests Test

The Court’s decisions applying the zone-of-interests test
demonstrate how the textualist method of inferring from statutory text,
rather than considering legislative intent, has had the effect of
broadening the scope of parties who are determined to have statutory
standing. This consequence of the textualist method likely concerned
Justice Scalia, who had generally supported limits on standing.
In this Section, we will consider how Justice Scalia began to narrow
the test for statutory standing that threatened to allow too many parties
to have a right to bring an action in federal court. As we have seen,
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court in Lexmark International, 317
established the presumptive use of the zone-of-interests test in nonAPA cases. 318 The Court there also applied the zone-of-interests test to
determine whether the claimant had statutory standing to bring its
action under the Lanham Act. 319

Patchak, 567 U.S. at 224–26.
See NCUA, 522 U.S. at 492–94
317 See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014).
318 See supra notes 216–20 and accompanying text.
319 Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which defines the claim brought by Static Control,
provides as follows:
315
316

(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or
any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which—
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as
to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s
goods, services, or commercial activities,
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One might have anticipated that the Court, after concluding,
notwithstanding the Lanham Act’s broad text, 320 that the statute
required the application of the zone-of-interests test, would have
applied that test as it is applied under the APA, the statute from which
the test emerged. Justice Scalia, however, introduced his application of
the test by stating that the Court takes a “lenient approach” to the test
when deciding whether a party has statutory standing under the APA. 321
Summarizing the Court’s analysis in Patchak, 322 Justice Scalia stated that
[I]n the APA context, . . . the test is not especially demanding. In that
context we have often conspicuously included the word arguably in
the test to indicate that the benefit of any doubt goes to the plaintiff,
and have said that the test forecloses suit only when a plaintiff’s
interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the
purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed
that Congress authorized that plaintiff to sue. 323

Justice Scalia then explained the generous scope of the test in the
APA context by stating that
That lenient approach is an appropriate means of preserving the
flexibility of the APA’s omnibus judicial-review provision, which
permits suit for violations of numerous statutes of varying character
that do not themselves include causes of action for judicial review.
We have made clear, however, that the breadth of the zone of
interests varies according to the provisions of law at issue, so that
what comes within the zone of interests of a statute for purposes of
obtaining judicial review of administrative action under the generous
review provisions of the APA may not do so for other purposes. 324

shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is
likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2018).
320 See supra note 216.
321 Lexmark Int’l, 572 U.S. 118, 130.
322 The Court’s analysis in Patchak is discussed in text accompanying supra notes 298–312.
323 Lexmark Int’l, 572 U.S. at 130 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
324 Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted).
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Having suggested that the zone-of-interests test will not be quite so
“generous” in this non-APA context, 325 Justice Scalia proceeded to
decide whether Static Control had statutory standing under the Lanham
Act. He stated that: “Identifying the interests protected by the Lanham
Act, however, requires no guesswork, since the Act includes an unusual,
and extraordinarily helpful, detailed statement of the statute’s
purposes.” 326 The relevant Lanham Act provision states that:
The intent of this chapter is to regulate commerce within the control
of Congress by making actionable the deceptive and misleading use
of marks in such commerce; to protect registered marks used in such
commerce from interference by State, or territorial legislation; to
protect persons engaged in such commerce against unfair
competition; to prevent fraud and deception in such commerce by
the use of reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or colorable imitations
of registered marks; and to provide rights and remedies stipulated by
treaties and conventions respecting trademarks, trade names, and
unfair competition entered into between the United States and
foreign nations. 327

Justice Scalia concluded that this provision indicated that the
statute protects commercial interests by preventing “injuries to business
reputation and present and future sales.” 328 He distinguished this
commercial interest from the interests of either “[a] consumer who is
hoodwinked into purchasing a disappointing product” 329 or “a business
misled by a supplier into purchasing an inferior product.” 330 Rather than
commercial interests, these are consumer interests. 331
325 Justice Scalia had made a similar statement in Bennett v. Spear, although the language is
not altogether clear: “We have made clear [] that the breadth of the zone of interests varies
according to the provisions of law at issue, so that what comes within the zone of interests of a
statute for purposes of obtaining judicial review of administrative action under the generous
review provisions of the APA may not do so for other purposes.” 520 U.S. 154, 163 (1997)
(internal quotations and citation omitted).
326 Lexmark Int’l, 572 U.S. at 131 (citation omitted).
327 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
328 Lexmark Int’l, 572 U.S. at 131 (citation omitted).
329 Id. at 132.
330 Id.
331 Justice Scalia did not discuss whether a commercial interest is implicated if the
disappointing product harms a company’s production of the products that it offers for sale. Id.
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The Court’s approach to evaluating the interests protected by the
statute and the interests that the plaintiff claims have been harmed
seems largely consistent with how the Court applies the zone-ofinterests test in APA cases. Justice Scalia, however, next proceeded to
identify a new, additional component of zone-of-interests analysis:
We generally presume that a statutory cause of action is limited to
plaintiffs whose injuries are proximately caused by violations of the
statute. For centuries, it has been a well-established principle of [the
common] law, that in all cases of loss, we are to attribute it to the
proximate cause, and not to any remote cause. That venerable
principle reflects the reality that the judicial remedy cannot
encompass every conceivable harm that can be traced to alleged
wrongdoing. 332

Because Justice Scalia had established earlier in Lexmark
International that the scope of statutory standing is defined by the
legislature, rather than a court’s notion of appropriate prudential
limits, 333 he needed to establish his newly articulated limit on zone-ofinterests standing as one that the legislature itself had defined. Justice
Scalia had rehearsed this exact interpretive move more than twenty
years earlier in a separate concurring opinion in Holmes v. Securities
Investor Protection Corp. 334
There, the Court had granted certiorari to resolve an issue of
statutory standing upon which the Courts of Appeals had divided.335
The plaintiff, the Securities Investor Protection Corp. (SIPC), was
neither a purchaser nor a seller of the securities that had allegedly been
illegally traded. 336 The lower courts had reached contrary conclusions
about whether the SIPC had statutory standing to bring the action
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO)337 when the predicate offenses were claimed violations of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 338
332
333
334
335
336
337
338

Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted).
See supra note 72.
Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 286–90 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring).
See id. at 286.
See id. at 264-65, n.7 (majority opinion).
Id. at 258; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–62 (2018).
See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2018); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2019).
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The Court held, in an opinion by Justice Souter, that the SIPC
could not maintain the action under RICO. 339 Justice Souter held that a
party may bring an action under RICO only when it is able to prove
proximate cause, because the language allowing the RICO claim was
borrowed from the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act and Congress was
aware that the Court had previously established a proximate cause limit
on the injuries for which claimants could recover under those
statutes. 340 Having concluded that the SIPC could not bring its claims
for a reason other than that it was not a purchaser or a seller of
securities, the Court declined to decide the statutory standing issue on
which it had granted review. 341
Justice O’Connor, joined by Justices White and Stevens, joined the
majority, but presented her view that the Court should still resolve the
remaining statutory standing issue. 342 Justice O’Connor’s analysis of
statutory standing under RICO began with the text, which “authorizes
‘[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation
of section 1962’ to sue for treble damages in federal court.” 343 She first
concluded that “RICO’s civil suit provision, considered on its face, has
no purchaser/seller standing requirement.” 344 She emphasized in this
regard that “the words ‘any person’ cannot reasonably be read to mean
only purchasers and sellers of securities.” 345
Although Justice O’Connor agreed with the majority that the
textual requirement that the plaintiff’s injury occur “by reason of” a
statutory violation necessitated a proximately-caused injury, 346 she
declined to find that the language required that a plaintiff be a purchaser
or a seller of securities: “Although the words ‘injury in [one’s] business
or property’ and ‘by reason of’ are words of limitation, they do not
categorically exclude nonpurchasers and nonsellers of securities from
the universe of RICO plaintiffs.” 347
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347

See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 261.
See id. at 267–68.
See id. at 275–76.
See id. at 276-77 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 278 (quoting 18 U.S.C. 1964(c) (1982 ed., Supp. II)).
Id.
Id. at 279.
See id.
Id. at 279–80.
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Justice O’Connor then concluded that a seller or purchaser
limitation should not be inferred because the predicate act of violating
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 required that the
party be a purchaser or seller of a security. 348 Justice O’Connor decided
that the Court itself had inferred a private right of action for a violation
of § 10(b) and that the purchaser or seller limitation on that action was a
proper “prudential means of avoiding the problems of proof when no
security was traded and the nuisance potential of vexatious litigation.” 349
A plaintiff’s action under RICO is expressly provided by Congress,
rather than inferred by the judiciary. Justice O’Connor argued that, even
if the broad scope of the right of action defined by Congress gives rise to
the “very real specter of vexatious litigation based on speculative
damages,” 350 the Court must defer to and accept the decision of
Congress:
Congress has authorized “[a]ny person injured in his business or
property by reason of” a RICO violation to bring suit under
§ 1964(c). Despite the very real specter of vexatious litigation based
on speculative damages, it is within Congress’ power to create a
private right of action for plaintiffs who have neither bought nor sold
securities. For the reasons stated above, I think Congress has done so.
That being the case, the courts are without authority to restrict the
application of the statute. 351

In sum, Justice O’Connor decided that, because of the broad scope
of statutory standing defined by Congress in RICO, a plaintiff could
bring an action based on a violation of the Securities Exchange Act even
if the plaintiff was neither the purchaser nor seller of the securities,
provided that the plaintiff met the proximate cause requirement defined
by Congress’s grant of statutory standing.
Justice Scalia was alone in his separate opinion concurring in the
Court’s judgment. 352 His decision in Holmes provides an important
insight into his interpretive method. For Justice Scalia, although the text

348
349
350
351
352

See id. at 280.
Id. at 285 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 285–86 (emphasis in original) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Id. at 286 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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of a provision is important, the background legal rule against which
Justice Scalia determines the legislature has acted may have even greater
importance. In evaluating the statutory standing of the plaintiff in
Holmes, Justice Scalia was not moved by the majority’s view that the
statutory language borrowed by Congress from earlier statutes included
a well understood proximate cause limit. 353 Justice Scalia rejected this
narrow, statute specific approach. He instead asserted that when
Congress enacted RICO, Congress was acting within a legal structure
that broadly accepted the requirement of proximate cause and that this
limitation on a statutory right of action applies unless Congress enacts
text very clearly providing that the accepted limitation does not apply:
The ultimate question here is statutory standing: whether the socalled nexus (mandatory legalese for “connection”) between the harm
of which this plaintiff complains and the defendant’s so-called
predicate acts is of the sort that will support an action under civil
RICO. One of the usual elements of statutory standing is proximate
causality. It is required in RICO not so much because RICO has
language similar to that of the Clayton Act, which in turn has
language similar to that of the Sherman Act, which, by the time the
Clayton Act had been passed, had been interpreted to include a
proximate-cause requirement; but rather, I think, because it has
always been the practice of common-law courts (and probably of all
courts, under all legal systems) to require as a condition of recovery,
unless the legislature specifically prescribes otherwise, that the injury
have been proximately caused by the offending conduct. Life is too
short to pursue every human act to its most remote consequences;
“for want of a nail, a kingdom was lost” is a commentary on fate, not
the statement of a major cause of action against a blacksmith. 354

In the next paragraph of his concurrence, Justice Scalia employed
this same interpretive approach to support his conclusion that a private
RICO claimant has statutory standing only if the claimant comes within
the statutory zone of interests. This too is “a background practice

353 See id. at 267 (majority opinion). For more on Justice Souter’s majority opinion, see
supra notes 339–41.
354 Id. at 286–87 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
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against which Congress legislates” 355 and which Congress overrules only
when it includes text that clearly accomplishes that result:
Yet another element of statutory standing is compliance with what I
shall call the “zone-of-interests” test, which seeks to determine
whether, apart from the directness of the injury, the plaintiff is within
the class of persons sought to be benefited by the provision at issue.
Judicial inference of a zone-of-interests requirement, like judicial
inference of a proximate-cause requirement, is a background practice
against which Congress legislates. Sometimes considerable
limitations upon the zone of interests are set forth explicitly in the
statute itself—but rarely, if ever, are those limitations so complete
that they are deemed to preclude the judicial inference of others. If,
for example, a securities fraud statute specifically conferred a cause of
action upon “all purchasers, sellers, or owners of stock injured by
securities fraud,” I doubt whether a stockholder who suffered a heart
attack upon reading a false earnings report could recover his medical
expenses. So also here. The phrase “any person injured in his
business or property by reason of” the unlawful activities makes clear
that the zone of interests does not extend beyond those injured in
that respect—but does not necessarily mean that it includes all those
injured in that respect. Just as the phrase does not exclude normal
judicial inference of proximate cause, so also it does not exclude
normal judicial inference of zone of interests. 356

Justice Scalia also reinforced his view of the close link between the
proximate cause and zone of interests limit on statutory standing:
My terminology may not be entirely orthodox. It may be that
proximate causality is itself an element of the zone-of-interests test as
that phrase has ordinarily been used, but that usage would leave us
bereft of terminology to connote those aspects of the “violationinjury connection” aspect of standing that are distinct from
proximate causality. 357

355
356
357

Id.
See id. at 287–88 (emphasis in original) (citation and footnote omitted).
Id. at 287 n.*.
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In sum, Justice Scalia’s separate opinion in Holmes presented his
view that, when defining the scope of statutory standing, Congress acts
against a background rule that the limits of proximate cause and zone of
interests will be recognized by courts unless Congress plainly negates
those limits in the text of the provision defining the cause of action. He
found a majority of the Court to adopt this view of the applicability of
the zone-of-interests test to determine statutory standing earlier in
Lexmark International, notwithstanding very broad statutory text. 358
The Lexmark International Court also presented a majority ready to join
Justice Scalia’s view that there is also a presumptive proximate cause
limit on statutory standing, at least in the non-APA context.
Writing for the Lexmark International majority, Justice Scalia
opined that:
[W]e generally presume that a statutory cause of action is limited to
plaintiffs whose injuries are proximately caused by violations of the
statute. For centuries, it has been a ‘well established principle of [the
common] law, that in all cases of loss, we are to attribute it to the
proximate cause, and not to any remote cause.’ That venerable
principle reflects the reality that ‘the judicial remedy cannot
encompass every conceivable harm that can be traced to alleged
wrongdoing.’ Congress, we assume, is familiar with the common-law
rule and does not mean to displace it sub silentio. We have thus
construed federal causes of action in a variety of contexts to
incorporate a requirement of proximate causation. No party disputes
that it is proper to read § 1125(a) as containing such a requirement,
its broad language notwithstanding. 359

Justice Scalia admitted that this presumed proximate cause limit “is
not easy to define, and over the years it has taken various forms.” 360 He
suggested, however, that courts will make the limitation work because
they “have a great deal of experience applying it, and there is a wealth of
precedent for them to draw upon in doing so.”361 Justice Scalia did not
acknowledge the implicit irony that he had taken the position that

358
359
360
361

See supra notes 328–33 and accompanying text.
Lexmark Int’l Inc. v. Static Control Components Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014).
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
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statutory standing is a status that is to be defined by the legislature,
which he now interpreted to have implicitly delegated to the courts the
authority to apply an uncertain limit on the scope of the cause of
action. 362 He did, however, state that the proximate cause determination
will be informed by the statutory context: “Proximate-cause analysis is
controlled by the nature of the statutory cause of action. The question it
presents is whether the harm alleged has a sufficiently close connection
to the conduct the statute prohibits.” 363 Justice Scalia distinguished the
proximate cause limit on statutory standing from the far less limiting
cause-in-fact requirement for Article III standing. 364
Applying the proximate cause limitation to the question of
statutory standing, the Court:
[H]old[s] that a plaintiff suing under § 1125(a) ordinarily must show
economic or reputational injury flowing directly from the deception
wrought by the defendant’s advertising; and that that occurs when
deception of consumers causes them to withhold trade from the
plaintiff. That showing is generally not made when the deception
produces injuries to a fellow commercial actor that in turn affect the
plaintiff. For example, while a competitor who is forced out of
business by a defendant’s false advertising generally will be able to
sue for its losses, the same is not true of the competitor’s landlord, its
electric company, and other commercial parties who suffer merely as
a result of the competitor’s inability to meet [its] financial
obligations. 365

After summarizing the Court’s decision “that a direct application
of the zone-of-interests test and the proximate-cause requirement
supplies the relevant limits on who may sue,”366 the Court decided that

See supra notes 347–52.
Lexmark Int’l, 572 U.S. at 131–32.
364 See id. at 134 n.6 (“Proximate causation is not a requirement of Article III standing,
which requires only that the plaintiff’s injury be fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct.”).
Article III standing of Static Control was not contested. See id. at 125 (“Lexmark does not deny
that Static Control’s allegations of lost sales and damage to its business reputation give it
standing under Article III to press its false-advertising claim, and we are satisfied that they
do.”).
365 Id. (citation, footnote, and internal quotations omitted).
366 Id.
362
363

Healy.40.6.5 (Do Not Delete)

2019]

7/15/2019 4:47 PM

JUSTICE SCALIA’S TEXTUALISM

2935

Static Control’s allegations were sufficient to meet the statutory standing
requirements. Regarding the zone-of-interests test, the Court concluded
that, “Static Control’s alleged injuries—lost sales and damage to its
business reputation—are injuries to precisely the sorts of commercial
interests the Act protects. Static Control is suing not as a deceived
consumer, but as a ‘perso[n] engaged in’ ‘commerce within the control
of Congress’ whose position in the marketplace has been damaged by
Lexmark’s false advertising. § 1127. There is no doubt that it is within
the zone of interests protected by the statute.” 367
The Court also concluded that the plaintiff’s allegations of injury
were sufficient to meet the initial requirements for proximate cause:
Static Control adequately alleged proximate causation by alleging
that it designed, manufactured, and sold microchips that both (1)
were necessary for, and (2) had no other use than, refurbishing
Lexmark toner cartridges. It follows from that allegation that any
false advertising that reduced the remanufacturers’ business
necessarily injured Static Control as well. Taking Static Control’s
assertions at face value, there is likely to be something very close to a
1:1 relationship between the number of refurbished Prebate
cartridges sold (or not sold) by the remanufacturers and the number
of Prebate microchips sold (or not sold) by Static Control. 368

The question, however, was not finally resolved, because Static
Control was still required to present proof of proximate cause:
“Although we conclude that Static Control has alleged an adequate basis
to proceed under § 1125(a), it cannot obtain relief without evidence of
injury proximately caused by Lexmark’s alleged misrepresentations. We
hold only that Static Control is entitled to a chance to prove its case.” 369

Id. at 137.
Id. at 138–39 (citations and footnote omitted).
369 Id. at 140. After this decision, Apex Technology, the company that owns Static Control,
purchased Lexmark International, thereby rendering functionally moot the Lanham Act claims.
Lexmark announces completion of acquisition by Apex Technology and PAG Asia Capital,
LEXMARK (Nov. 29, 2016) https://newsroom.lexmark.com/2016-11-29-Lexmark-announcescompletion-of-acquisition-by-Apex-Technology-and-PAG-Asia-Capital
[https://perma.cc/UZ5P-JAZD].
367
368

Healy.40.6.5 (Do Not Delete)

2936
C.

7/15/2019 4:47 PM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:2861

How Justice Scalia’s New Limits on the Zone-of-Interests Test Show
the Limits of the Textualist Method

An evaluation of Justice Scalia’s decision for the Court in Lexmark
should begin at the place where a textualist would demand that the
analysis of the scope of statutory standing defined by Congress must
begin: the statutory text. In that relevant text, Congress had provided
that an action claiming a violation may be brought “by any person who
believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.” 370 We
have seen and evaluated Justice Scalia’s conclusion that a claimant
would have statutory standing only if the person were within the zoneof-interests. 371 We have now seen two other conclusions that Justice
Scalia presented about this statutory provision. He decided that the
injury to the plaintiff’s interests must have been proximately caused by
the claimed statutory violation, 372 and that this proximate cause
requirement would not be applicable to a person who was bringing an
APA action and subject to showing that the person was arguably within
the zone of interests. 373 We will now discuss how each of the latter two
components of the Court’s decision in Lexmark conflicts with the claims
of the textualist method.
1.

The Judicial Source of the New Proximate-Cause Requirement

We have discussed how the textualist method, because it relies
upon inference of interests, rather than the intent of Congress, is
ineffective in limiting the scope of statutory standing determined by the
zone-of-interests test. 374 We have also seen that Justice Scalia was a
strong supporter of constrained constitutional standing under Article
III. 375 Despite Justice Scalia’s admonition that courts should not ignore

370
371
372
373
374
375

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2018).
See supra Part III.
See supra Section IV.B.
See supra text accompanying notes 313–19.
See supra Section IV.A.2.
See supra text accompanying notes 161–63.
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text in order to “avoid[ ] unhappy consequences,” 376 his recent effort to
constrain the scope of zone-of-interests standing has the appearance of
the judicial activism that he claimed to constrain by use of the textualist
method. 377
More than a century ago, Roscoe Pound described how a court,
through the use of “spurious interpretation,” may act in a legislative
manner by itself defining the law through the interpretive process. 378
Justice Scalia’s claim was that the textualist method constrains courts by
ensuring that they focus their interpretive efforts only on the text
enacted by Congress. 379
Lexmark International presents an example, however, of how
Justice Scalia reached interpretive conclusions that did not reflect the
meaning of the statutory text. Notwithstanding the exceptionally broad
text enacted by the legislature and the Court’s initial understanding of
that breadth in Oregon-Washington R.R. 380 and Sanders Bros., 381 the
textualist Justice Scalia initially restricted the statutory standing to those
within the zone-of-interests 382 and later to those whose injury is viewed
by a court as having been proximately caused by the claimed illegality. 383
Rather than give the words used by Congress their ordinary
meaning, Justice Scalia imputed to Congress an ornate understanding of
the meaning of the words included in the statutory text. 384 He thereby
avoided having to do the work of locating in the legislative history
evidence that Congress specifically intended the text to have a complex,
unstated meaning. Whereas reliance on legislative history would have
376 Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 141 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I do not
think, however, that the avoidance of unhappy consequences is adequate basis for interpreting a
text.”).
377 See supra text accompanying notes 352–357.
378 Roscoe Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 379, 382 (1907) (“[T]he object
of spurious interpretation is to make, unmake, or remake, and not merely to discover. It puts a
meaning into the text as a juggler puts coins, or what not, into a dummy’s hair, to be pulled
forth presently with an air of discovery. It is essentially a legislative, not a judicial
process . . . .”).
379 See supra text accompanying notes 20–23.
380 See supra text accompanying notes 113–18.
381 See supra text accompanying notes 127–36.
382 See supra text accompanying notes 188–229.
383 See supra text accompanying notes 352–62.
384 See supra text accompanying notes 373–76.
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necessitated the use of and reference to legislative materials, Justice
Scalia’s approach skipped the middleman and permitted the Court
simply to impute a meaning to words that was nowhere evident in
legislative history and appeared to contradict the ordinary meaning of
text and how that text would be understood to a reader today or at the
time of enactment. This result is one that Justice Scalia, in a different
case, might have condemned as a “curious, narrow, hidden” meaning
that a court must avoid. 385
Justice Scalia’s interpretive move in Lexmark was not new. When
reviewing agency actions, Justice Scalia became adept at discerning rules
of interpretation that permitted him to look past the ambiguous
statutory text, which would ordinarily permit agency action, to hold that
an agency action was unlawful, because he decided that the agency
could lawfully take the action being challenged only when clear
statutory text authorized the agency action. 386 His decisions recognized
that the law necessarily involved the exercise of discretion because of
arguable indeterminacy. 387 The core issue was accordingly the legal actor
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2497 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he plain,
obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow,
hidden sense that nothing but the exigency of a hard case and the ingenuity and study of an
acute and powerful intellect would discover.”) (quoting Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267
U.S. 364, 370 (1925)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
386 See Healy, supra note 34, at 416 (discussing how Justice Scalia has rejected an agency
interpretation because he concluded that statutory ambiguity, “because of the application of a
required clear statement rule, is an insufficient legislative grant of power when the agency is
making a decision that has great regulatory effect”); Michael P. Healy, Reconciling Chevron,
Mead, and the Review of Agency Discretion: Source of Law and the Standards of Judicial Review,
19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 36–37 (2011) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s use of clear statement rules
has had the effect of making facially ambiguous statutes insufficient to authorize some
administrative actions. When a clear statement rule applies, the Court has held that Congress
must have provided an agency with clear authority to take administrative action or the agency’s
exercise of regulatory authority will be viewed as contrary to the law defined by Congress.”).
387 See Christensen v. Harriss County, 529 U.S. 576, 590 (2000) (Scalia, J. concurring), where
Justice Scalia discussed the significance of statutory indeterminacy and the rules of construction
regarding discretion delegated to agencies:
385

Chevron establishes a presumption that ambiguities are to be resolved (within the
bounds of reasonable interpretation) by the administering agency. The implausibility
of Congress’s leaving a highly significant issue unaddressed (and thus “delegating” its
resolution to the administering agency) is assuredly one of the factors to be
considered in determining whether there is ambiguity, but once ambiguity is
established the consequences of Chevron attach.
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who had the authority to exercise that discretion. In the statutory
standing context, who determined the right of a party to bring a
statutory claim in federal court? Justice Scalia’s rules of interpretation
typically located that authority in courts. That authority was not
presented as discretionary; it was authority located in the court as a
consequence of the court’s own rules of interpretation.
The effect of this new proximate cause requirement is to limit the
scope of statutory standing. Under this limitation, the plaintiff may have
an interest that is within the zone-of-interests arguably protected by the
statute, but nevertheless not have statutory standing because that
interest is not injured proximately by the breach of the statutory
provision that forms the gravamen of the plaintiff’s complaint. Under
this approach, a plaintiff who has Article III standing may lack statutory
standing because the court determines there is no proximate cause.
Given that Article III standing has already imposed a causation-in-fact
requirement, it is noteworthy that the Court held that the legislature—
by the enactment of text broadly granting statutory standing—has also
required that there be proximate causation. Justice Scalia had decided in
Defenders of Wildlife that a party had to have Article III standing in
order to bring a claim as an aggrieved party. 388 In Lexmark
International, he decided that a party with Article III standing must
have been proximately injured to bring an “aggrieved party” claim, even
without any direct evidence that Congress actually intended any such
limit. 389
It is bad enough that the Court presumed that Congress had
provided for the use of a statutory standing test that was not even
identified by the Court itself until after the relevant statutory text had
been enacted. It is even worse that the Court has imported into the
standard limits on a party’s ability to assert a statutory claim that is
additive to the limits defined by Article III with neither statutory text
nor legislative intent to support the newly minted limits. It is ironic in
the “person aggrieved” context that the Court appended a common law
limit on the form of statutory standing that Congress enacted to

Id. at 589 n.* (internal citation omitted).
388 See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
389 See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014).
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supersede the then-applicable legal interest test, with its source in the
common law. 390
2.

The Unconvincing Distinction Between the Zone-of-Interests Test
in the APA and the Non-APA Contexts

The other curious aspect of Justice Scalia’s decision in Lexmark
International to graft a proximate cause requirement onto the zone-ofinterests test was his decision that the proximate cause requirement
would not apply to the APA zone-of-interests test. This decision needs
to be assessed in the context of Justice Scalia’s claim that the legislature
had the power to define the scope of statutory standing. 391
For more than forty years, the zone-of-interests test, which was, of
course, entirely the invention of the judiciary, 392 did not include a
proximate-cause requirement. After the decision in Lexmark
International, a party claiming zone-of-interests standing under a
statute that is not the APA must demonstrate proximate-cause of the
injury. 393 What is the explanation for the difference in the application of
the two tests? One might expect that there would be a plain difference in
the relevant statutory text. Justice Scalia did not, however, rely on
statutory text to explain the application of the proximate cause limit. He
relied, instead, on his view that the legislature expected that this limit
would apply. 394
See supra text accompanying notes 219–30.
See supra text accompanying notes 78–80.
392 See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
393 See Lexmark Int’l, 572 U.S. at 131–32.
394 Justice Scalia’s argument in Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258,
287 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring), which disavowed reliance on the meaning of text, was that:
390
391

One of the usual elements of statutory standing is proximate causality. It is required
in RICO not so much because RICO has language similar to that of the Clayton Act,
which in turn has language similar to that of the Sherman Act, which, by the time the
Clayton Act had been passed, had been interpreted to include a proximate-cause
requirement; but rather, I think, because it has always been the practice of commonlaw courts (and probably of all courts, under all legal systems) to require as a
condition of recovery, unless the legislature specifically prescribes otherwise, that the
injury have been proximately caused by the offending conduct.
Id.
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Although this explanation is unconvincing in assigning to the
legislature the source of the proximate-cause requirement, it begs the
question about how this legislative understanding applies to the zoneof-interests test only outside of the APA context. 395 Justice Scalia did not
clearly answer this question. Certainly, he did not find a distinction in
the relevant text of the different statutory standing provisions. Those
provisions, of course, make no mention of a zone-of-interests test,
which was invented by the Supreme Court in 1970, after Congress had
enacted provisions referring to the right of an aggrieved party to bring
an action. 396
He grounds the different scope of statutory standing under the
APA on the Supreme Court’s understanding that the APA had provided
broadly for such standing. 397 The decision to view the statutory standing
granted by “person aggrieved” provisions outside of the APA as limited
by proximate-cause has no relation to statutory text and appears
unbound from the claims of externality and objectivity made by the
textualist method. An important question for future statutory standing
law is whether the proximate-cause limit is applicable in determining
statutory standing under § 702 of the APA. As we have seen, Congress
did not intend to provide statutory standing directly when it enacted
§ 702. 398 Indeed, when the text and intent of Congress are considered, a
proximate cause limitation is arguably more defensible under the APA
than under other statutes that directly provide person aggrieved
standing.
That Justice Scalia decided that a proximate cause limit applies to
the non-APA zone-of-interests test but not to the APA zone-of-interests
is itself compelling evidence that the limit applies because of the
preferences of the Court, rather than because of the decision of

See supra Section IV.C.1.
See supra notes 214–16 and accompanying text.
397 Lexmark Int’l, 572 U.S. at 130 (2014) (the Court takes a “lenient approach” when
deciding whether a party has statutory standing under the APA); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154,
163 (1997) (“[T]he breadth of the zone of interests varies according to the provisions of law at
issue, so that what comes within the zone of interests of a statute for purposes of obtaining
judicial review of administrative action under the generous review provisions of the APA may
not do so for other purposes.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
398 See supra note 139 and accompanying text. Rather, Congress intended to codify current
law, which did not account for proximate cause. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
395
396
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Congress. An interpretive method that permits this conclusion without
the consideration of what Congress intended should be accepted, if at
all, with humility and the most modest of claims.
CONCLUSION
Two decisions written by Justice Scalia near the end of his life
reshaped the law of statutory standing and provided important insights
into the claims and limits of textualism. By changing the legal
terminology from prudential standing to statutory standing, Justice
Scalia framed his claim that Congress had sole authority to define the
parties who have a right to bring a claim in federal court, assuming
Article III standing requirements were met. Locating this authority in
the legislature, rather than in the judiciary’s exercise of its own
prudential power, reinforced Justice Scalia’s claim that his textualist
method ensured legislative supremacy and limited opportunities for
judicial activism.
Despite this claim, Justice Scalia’s other two changes to the law of
statutory standing had the effect of constraining, by judicial
interpretation, the scope of statutory standing relative to statutory text
and legislative intent. First, Justice Scalia interpreted statutory text that
was extremely broad in the legislative grant of statutory standing and
intended to allow an action by an aggrieved party suffering Article III
injury-in-fact by a claimed government illegality to grant statutory
standing only to a party who met the zone-of-interests test. Justice Scalia
reached this conclusion despite the fact that the zone-of-interests test
was fabricated by an activist Supreme Court after Congress had enacted
the statutes at issue in the cases.
The second change was that Justice Scalia, having determined for
the Court that the zone-of-interests test would determine whether a
party had statutory standing, concluded that the zone-of-interests test,
when applied outside the APA context, necessitated a showing that the
claimed illegality proximately caused the injury to the person bringing
the claim. This proximate cause requirement cannot be found in
statutory text or in legislative history. Rather, Justice Scalia decided that
Congress must have imposed a proximate cause limit when the zone-ofinterests test applied and, at least for now, when the claim was not
brought under the APA.

Healy.40.6.5 (Do Not Delete)

2019]

7/15/2019 4:47 PM

JUSTICE SCALIA’S TEXTUALISM

2943

This interpretive result is, of course, claimed to follow from the
prescription of the legislature, rather than the prudent activism of the
judiciary. Contrary to this claim of textualism, the decisions in Lexmark
International and Thompson show that Justice Scalia was willing and
able to be an activist judge when the text enacted by Congress did not
align with his own views of good policy. These decisions show the limits
of textualism and provide strong reasons to doubt the claims that the
preeminent advocate of textualism made about the virtues of that
interpretive method.

